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JURISDICTION 
Appellate jurisdiction over this case is rested in the Utah 
Court of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Ann* § 7 8-2a-3(2). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Should the trial court's findings of fact be affirmed 
because Appellants West Valley Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4 
(FOP) and Jim Crowley failed to marshal the evidence that supports 
the findings of fact? 
a. Standard of Appellate Review, The trial court's 
findings of fact are reviewed under the "clearly 
erroneous" standard. Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. A finding is considered "clearly 
erroneous" when, based upon the entire evidence, 
the reviewing court has a firm and definite 
conviction that a mistake was made. Peterson v. 
Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah App. 1991). In 
order to demonstrate that factual findings are 
clearly erroneous, Appellants must marshal the 
evidence supporting the trial court's findings, and 
then show that those findings are so lacking in 
support as to be clearly erroneous. West Valley 
City v. Majestic Investment Company, 818 P. 2d 1311 
(Utah App. 1991). If Appellants fail to marshal 
all of the evidence in support of the findings of 
fact, the trial court's findings of fact are 
conclusive and should not be disturbed. West 
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Valley City v. Majestic, at 1313; Bhatla v. 
Department of Employment Security, 188 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 40, 4 2 (Utah App. 1992); Morton v. Gem State 
Mutual, 794 P.2d 847 (Utah App. 1990). 
2. Is there sufficient evidence in the Record to support the 
trial court's findings of fact? 
a. Standard of Appellate Review. The appellate court 
views the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
judgment of the trial court. Harllne v. Campbell, 
728 P. 2d 980 (Utah 1986). Findings of fact will 
not be disturbed by the appellate courts unless 
there is no substantial evidence in the Record to 
support the findings. Bennion v. Hansen, 699 P.2d 
757 (Utah 1985) . 
3. Did the trial court correctly deteritiiine that Appellant 
FOP did not have standing to bring this action in its 
representative capacity? 
a. Standard of Appellate Review. The trial court's 
conclusions of law are reviewed independently by 
the appellate court for correctness. Eskelsen v. 
Perry, 819 P.2d 770, 771 (Utah 1991); Scharf v. BMG 
Corporation, 700 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). 
4. Did the trial court correctly decide that Plaintiff 
Crowley did not have standing to bring this action as an 
individual? 
2 
a. Standard of Review. The trial court's conclusions 
of law are reviewed independently by the appellate 
court for correctness. Eskelsen, at 771; Scharf, 
at 1070. 
5 . Did the trial court correctly decided that Appellants FOP 
and Crowley did not have standing to bring an action in the nature 
of an extraordinary writ? 
a. Standard of Review. The trial court's conclusions 
of law are reviewed independently by the appellate 
court for correctness. Eskelsen, at 771; Scharf, 
at 1070. 
6. Can Appellants FOP and Crowley appeal the trial court's 
denial of William Salmon and David Shopay's Motion for Joinder? 
a. Standard of Review. Parties cannot appeal trial 
court decisions which are not adverse to the 
appellant. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. v. 
Waterman, 106 U.S. 265 (1882); Utility Contractors 
Association of New Jersey, Inc. v. Toops, 507 F.2d 
83 (3rd Cir. 1974); International Brotherhood of 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs
 r Stablemen and Helpers of 
America, Local Union No. 523, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, 
v. Keystone Freight Lines, Inc., 123 F.2d 326 (10th 
Cir. 1941). 
7. Did the trial court correctly deny William Salmon and 
David Shopay's Motion for Joinder? 
3 
a. Standard of Review. The trial court's conclusions 
of law are reviewed independently by the appellate 
court for correctness. Eskelsen, at 771; Scharf, 
at 1070. 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This action was commenced by the FOP, an association, and Jim 
Crowley, an individual Police Officer, to review the actions and 
decisions of the West Valley City Civil Service Commission and the 
West Valley City Police Department with respect to an examination 
for promotion to Sergeant that occurred in July, 1989. The 
Complaint, Amended Complaint and Corrected Amended Complaint all 
sought to have the results of the promotion examination nullified, 
and the Commission and Police Chief ordered to conduct a new, 
different promotional process. 
A. PROCEEDINGS IN THE TRIAL COURT. 
The original Complaint was filed on December 21, 1989. During 
1990, Plaintiffs conducted discovery by way of depositions, 
interrogatories and requests for production of documents. During 
February, 1991, the FOP and Crowley filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, and the Commission and Nordfelt filed a Motion to Dismiss 
for Lack of Standing. All parties provided the court with 
affidavits and documents in support of their respective positions. 
In March, 1991, William Salmon and David Shopay, West Valley City 
Police Officers, filed a Motion for Joinder to join the action as 
plaintiffs. On August 23, 1991, the court held a hearing on 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' Motion to 
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Dismiss. At that hearing, the trial court denied Plaintiffs' 
Motion for Summary Judgment, and took Defendants' Motion to Dismiss 
under advisement. Following the hearing, the parties were allowed 
to again supplement the Record by way of additional memoranda and 
affidavits. 
B. NATURE OF PROCEEDING AND BURDEN OF PROOF IN THE TRIAL 
COURT. 
Plaintiffs' Motion to Dismiss was a facial and factual attack 
on the standing of the FOP and Crowley to bring this action. The 
Motion was made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure (Exhibit C) . The Appellants, while acknowledging that 
Defendant's Motion to Dismiss was made pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), 
incorrectly provide the court with the standard and case citations 
that relate to motions to dismiss brought pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6). (Appellants' Brief, pp. 17-18.) The two types of 
motions have different standards and are not interchangeable. 
The relevant case law clearly distinguishes between motions 
made under Rule 12(b)(6) and other Rule 12(b) motions. This Court 
may look to the federal courts for assistance in determining the 
proper interpretation of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Winegar v. Slim Olson, 252 P. 2d 205 (Utah 1953). 12(b)(6) motions 
alone necessitate a ruling on the merits of the claim; the other 
available motions, including a 12(b)(1) motion such as this, deal 
with procedural defects. Mortensen v. First Federal Savings and 
Loan Association, 549 F. 2d 884 (1977), The Mortensen decision 
explains that there are two types of 12(b)(1) motions. First, 
there are motions which attack the complaint on its face. The 
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facial attack offers safeguards similar to those found in a 
12(b)(6) motion in that the court must consider the allegations and 
evidence in a light favorable to the plaintiff. Mortensen, at 891. 
The second type of 12(b)(1) motion discussed in Mortensen is 
a factual attack on subject matter jurisdiction. The court stated 
that: 
Because at issue in a factual 12(b)(1) motion 
is the trial court's jurisdiction -- its very 
power to hear the case -- there is substantial 
authority that the trial court is free to 
weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to 
the existence of its power to hear the case. 
In short, no presumptive truthfulness attaches 
to plaintiff's allegations, and the existence 
of disputed material facts will not preclude 
the trial court from evaluating for itself the 
merits of jurisdictional claims. Moreover, 
the plaintiff will have the burden of proof 
that jurisdiction does in fact exist. 
Mortensen, at 891 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). 
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Adams v. Bain, 69 7 
F.2d 1213 (1982), came to a similar conclusion regarding a 12(b)(1) 
motion and stated that, "The burden of proving subject matter 
jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss is on the plaintiff, the party 
asserting jurisdiction. The trial court may consider evidence by 
affidavit, depositions or live testimony without converting the 
proceeding to one for summary judgment." Adams, at 1219. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 45 L.Ed.2d 343, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975), a case cited 
approvingly by Plaintiffs, states that in ruling upon a motion to 
dismiss for lack of standing: 
. . . it is within the trial court's power to 
allow or to require the plaintiff to supply, 
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by amendment to the complaint or by 
affidavits, further particularized allegations 
of fact deemed supportive of plaintiff's 
standing. If, after this opportunity, the 
plaintiff's standing does not adequately 
appear from all materials of record, the 
complaint must be dismissed. 
Warthr at 45 L.Ed.2d 356 (emphasis added). 
It is the trial court's prerogative to examine all the 
evidence that had been presented by both parties during the course 
of the litigation. In addition to the evidence presented in 
conjunction with Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, the court 
allowed Plaintiffs two opportunities to provide additional evidence 
specifically on the standing issue. The first opportunity came in 
response to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and the second 
opportunity came by way of supplemental memoranda and affidavits 
submitted following oral argument on the standing issue. The trial 
court concluded that Plaintiffs had presented the court with no 
evidence which established standing, and based its findings of fact 
upon the substantial body of evidence submitted by Defendants by 
way of documents and affidavits relating specific facts based upon 
personal knowledge. 
C. DISPOSITION. 
The court, the Honorable Judge Leslie A. Lewis presiding, 
issued a ruling on November 15, 1991, granting Defendants' Motion 
to Dismiss and denying the Motion for Joinder. Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order in this action were entered 
by the trial court on March 26, 1992. From that trial court Order, 
the FOP and Crowley now appeal on issues of fact and law. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED BECAUSE APPELLANTS' BRIEF FAILS TO 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTS THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT. 
The FOP and Crowley's Brief fails to marshal the evidence that 
supports the finding of fact of the trial court. Each disputed 
finding of the trial court is supported by substantial evidence in 
the Record; however, the FOP and Crowley only provide the court 
with argument and evidence which support their position. Because 
of their utter failure to comply with the appellate court's 
procedural standards, the trial court's findings of fact should be 
conclusive and should not be disturbed, 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED BECAUSE THEY WERE MADE WITH RELIANCE 
UPON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT. 
The trial court in this case made 16 specific findings of 
fact. Each of those facts is based upon substantial, competent 
evidence contained in the Record and presented to the trial court 
by all parties. The Commission and Nordfelt's argument provides 
specific examples of evidence, cited to the Record, which support 
each finding of fact being disputed by Appellants. 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFF FOP DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING 
THIS SUIT IN ITS REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY SINCE 
THERE EXIST OBVIOUS CONFLICTS AMONG ITS 
MEMBERS. 
The Commission and Nordfelt contend that the FOP cannot meet 
the association standing test set forth by the United States 
Supreme Court in Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 45 L.Ed. 2d 343, 95 
S. Ct. 2197 (1975); and adopted by the Utah Supreme Court in Utah 
Restaurant Association v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P. 2d 
1159 (Utah 1985); and Society of Professional Journalists v. 
Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987). The trial court found that the 
FOP did not have standing, either on the face of the Complaint or 
after an investigation of the facts of the case. The conflicts 
within the FOP are numerous and obvious. The FOP has named one of 
its own members, Nordfelt, as a Defendant. Also, it has deposed 
its own members as hostile witnesses. And, if the FOP is 
successful in this action, the result would be a loss of property 
rights for certain FOP members, who are not parties, who would be 
demoted from their positions as Sergeant. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT CROWLEY SUFFERED NO INJURY, AND, 
THEREFORE, DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING 
THIS ACTION AS AN INDIVIDUAL. 
The trial court correctly found that Crowley has suffered no 
particularized injury as a result of the actions of the Commission 
and Nordfelt, and, therefore, did not have standing to bring this 
suit. Crowley failed to pass the written examination for promotion 
to Sergeant. Crowley's failure on the written test is fatal to his 
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standing, since that failure alone precluded him from being 
promoted to Sergeant. Even if all of Crowley's allegations were 
true, his failure on the test eliminated him from any possibility 
of being promoted. Therefore, he could not have been injured by 
any actions of the Commission or Nordfelt. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN APPLYING THE 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT STANDING TEST. 
The trial court applied a third standing test to the FOP and 
Crowley. This test was set forth in the Society of Journalists 
case, and applies to actions for extraordinary writs. In this 
case, the Complaint filed by the FOP and Crowley may be considered 
to be an extraordinary writ under Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, since it is asking the trial court to review and direct 
the actions of a lower board, the Civil Service; Commission, and a 
public officer, the Police Chief. The trial court correctly found 
that the FOP could not meet the extraordinary writ standing test, 
because it did not have standing before the Civil Service 
Commission due to its obvious conflicts of interest which are 
discussed under Point III. Also, the ruling of the Civil Service 
Commission was not adverse to the FOP, and the FOP failed to 
present its claims to the lower body, the Commission. 
Crowley also fails to meet this test, since he lacked standing 
to proceed before the Commission on the same basis that he lacked 
standing to proceed before the trial court, as is set forth in 
Point IV. Also, he did not suffer an injury as a result of the 
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Commission or Nordfelt's actions, and, therefore, the rulings of 
the Commission were not adverse to Crowley. 
POINT VI 
APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF SALMON 
AND SHOPAY'S MOTION FOR JOINDER IS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT, AND SAID MOTION 
WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
The FOP and Crowley are clearly not the proper parties to 
bring an appeal of the denial of Salmon and Shopay's Motion for 
Joinder. The denial of that Motion did not affect the standing or 
rights of the FOP or Crowley, and is adverse only to Salmon and 
Shopay. Salmon and Shopay are not parties to this appeal. 
Assuming that the FOP and Crowley can bring an appeal of the 
denial of Salmon and Shopay's Motion for Joinder, the trial court's 
denial of that Motion was correct. Once the trial court had 
determined that the FOP and Crowley did not have standing, the 
trial court's only course of action was to dismiss the original 
Complaint. Once that Complaint had been dismissed, the Motion for 
Joinder became moot. In effect, once the trial court determined 
that the FOP and Crowley did not have standing, the court had no 
jurisdiction to grant a Motion for Joinder, since there was no 
action to join. 
Motions to join are permissive, and it was within the sound 
discretion of the trial court to deny the Motion for Joinder. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On June 6, 1989, the West Valley City Police Department 
issued a memorandum notice announcing a promotional examination for 
the position of Sergeant in the West Valley City Police Department 
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(Exhibit N). (R. 006) This notice set forth the qualifications 
necessary to compete for the position of Sergeant, and also 
provided information regarding the testing process. More 
specifically, the notice stated that: 
a. The passing grade for all tests was 75 percent. 
(R. 006, 185) 
b. The applicant must be off probation. (R. 006) 
This meant that the applicant was required to have 
one or more years of service with West Valley City 
before qualifying for promotion, since the Civil 
Service Commission Rules establish the probationary 
period as one year. (R. 282, 286) 
c. The written examination was to be conducted first, 
and the top 15 candidates with a passing score on 
the written examination would be invited to attend 
a two-day assessment center. (R. 006, 185) 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1010 and Rule III-l, West Valley 
City Civil Service Policy and Procedures Manual, provide that 
promotion shall be made from members of the next lower rank, when 
practicable (Exhibit E). (R. 284) 
3. The rank immediately below Sergeant in the West Valley 
City Police Department is Police Officer. Within the rank of 
Police Officer, there are three subdivisions known as "grades" — 
Police Officer I ("P.O. I"), Police Officer 3 1 ("P.O. II") and 
Police Officer III ("P.O. Ill") (Exhibits F, G and J). (R. 109, 
277, 279, 283-285) 
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4. On previous tests for the rank of Sergeant, the Civil 
Service Commission limited the applicant pool to those individuals 
with the grades of P.O. II or P.O. Ill within the rank of Police 
Officer. (R. 310) 
5. On or about June 6, 19 89, Defendant Dennis Nordfelt 
requested, in writing, Civil Service Commission approval to change 
the qualification criteria to allow P.O. I officers with sufficient 
seniority to qualify as P.O. II officers to test for the Sergeant 
position. Nordfelt made this request because there were several 
P.O. I officers with sufficient experience and time in service to 
be promoted to P.O. II positions, who had not been promoted due to 
budgetary constraints. (R. 110, 279-280) 
6. Nordfelt's request was forwarded to Guy Kimball, Civil 
Service Commission Chairman, who then consulted with the other 
members of the Commission. (R. 123-124) The Commission approved 
the Police Department's change in the qualification criteria, and 
P.O. I officers with sufficient experience and time in service to 
be P.O. II officers, who had not been promoted due to budgetary 
constraints, were allowed to compete for the position of Sergeant. 
(R. 110, 123) 
7. On July 20, 1989, the written promotional examination was 
given to those qualified applicants who appeared for testing. 
(R. 006, 008, 185) 
8. Plaintiff Jim Crowley took the written promotional 
examination and received a score below the passing grade of 75 
percent. (R. 185, 338) Crowley did not participate in the 
13 
remainder of the promotional process due to his failure to pass the 
written examination. (R. 185, 338) 
9. The top 15 officers with passing grades (above 75 
percent) on the written examination participated in a two-day 
assessment center. (R. 006, 008) 
10. Following the examination process, a promotional roster 
was issued and the top two officers were promoted to the rank of 
Sergeant. Those two officers were Charles Illsley and Guy Dodge. 
(R. 181, 186) 
11. On July 1, 1991, Officer Craig Gibson was promoted from 
the promotional roster to the rank of Sergeant. (R. 183) 
12. In August, 1991, the Sergeant's promotional roster became 
invalid due to the fact that it was more than two years old. Utah 
Code Ann. § 10-3-1009. 
13. On August 23, 1989, a group of Police Officers addressed 
the Civil Service Commission in writing, asking the Commission to 
"look into" what they perceived to be improprieties in the 
promotional process. (R. 010) 
14. The Civil Service Commission investigated the officers' 
complaints by making inquiries of Police Department administrative 
personnel and directing the City Personnel Department to evaluate 
test data. (R. 013) Following the investigation, the Commission 
issued a letter responding to the officers' complaints and 
upholding the validity of the promotional roster. (R. 013) 
15. On December 21, 1989, Plaintiffs filed the original 
Complaint in this action. (R. 002-014) During 1991, Plaintiffs 
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pursued various means of discovery, including Interrogatories 
(R. 024, 041) and Requests for Production of Documents (R. 023, 
041). Plaintiffs also took depositions from the following 
individuals (R. 47-48): 
a. Defendant Dennis Nordfelt (R. 61-62), West Valley 
City Police Chief and member of Plaintiff 
association, the Fraternal Order of Police (R. 175-
176, 186). 
b. J. Stephen Shreeve (R. 59-60), West Valley City 
Assistant Police Chief and member of Plaintiff 
association, the Fraternal Order of Police (R. 186, 
189). Shreeve was involved in formulating and 
administering the promotional process. (R. 189) 
c. Larry L Moody (R. 92-93), West Valley City Police 
Department Lieutenant and member of Plaintiff 
association, the Fraternal Order of Police (R. 178, 
186). Moody was involved in formulating and 
administering the promotional process. (R. 17 8) 
d. Guy Dodge (R. 50-51), West Valley City Police 
Officer promoted to Sergeant as a result of the 
July, 1989 Sergeant's promotional examination 
(R. 186), and member of Plaintiff association, the 
Fraternal Order of Police (R. 186). 
e. Sue (Mooney) Pipkin (R. 55-56), West Valley City 
Police Department Executive Secretary (R. 135). 
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. f. Guy Kimball, West Valley City Civil Service 
Commission Chairman. (R. 63-65) 
g. Don Meyers, West Valley City Civil Service 
Commissioner. (R. 68-69) 
h. Elaine Powell, West Valley City Civil Service 
Commissioner. (R. 66-67) 
i. Cory Ervin (R. 52-54), Personnel Generalist in the 
West Valley City Personnel Office and Secretary to 
the West Valley City Civil Service Commission 
(R. 184-185, 281-282). 
16. On or about February 15, 1991, Plaintiffs filed 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment. (R. 94-95) 
17. On or about February 19, 1991, Defendants filed 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Standing. (R. 162-163) 
18. On or about March 28, 1991, West Valley City Police 
Officers David Shopay and William Salmon filed a Motion for 
Joinder. (R. 216-217) 
19. Following the submission of memoranda, affidavits and 
documents by the parties, on August 23, 1991, the Court held a 
hearing on Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment and Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss. (R. 264) At that hearing, the trial court 
denied Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and took 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss under advisement. (R. 313) Both 
parties were allowed to supplement the record by way of additional 
memoranda and affidavits. (R. 379) Plaintiffs filed a 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss and 
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additional affidavits. (R. 330-339, 344-358) Defendants filed a 
reply to Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum. (R. 362-370) 
20. On November 15, 1991, the trial court issued its ruling 
granting Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, denying Defendants' Motion 
to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memoranda and denying the Motion 
for Joinder (Exhibit A ) . (R. 428-430) 
21. On March 26, 199 2, the trial court entered its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order in this action 
(Exhibit B ) . (R. 438) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED BECAUSE APPELLANTS' BRIEF FAILS TO 
MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE THAT SUPPORTS THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT. 
The trial court's findings of fact that support its ruling are 
reviewed under the "clearly erroneous" standard. Rule 52(a), Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure. A finding is considered "clearly 
erroneous" when, based upon the entire evidence, the reviewing 
court has a firm and definite conviction that a mistake was made. 
Peterson v. Peterson, 818 P.2d 1305, 1308 (Utah App. 1991). This 
court has consistently held that in order to demonstrate that 
factual findings are clearly erroneous, the appellant must marshal 
all of the evidence supporting the trial court's findings and then 
show that those findings are so lacking in support as to be clearly 
erroneous. West Valley City v. Majestic Investment Company, 818 
P.2d at 1313. The marshaling requirement allows the court to 
consider the findings of fact from the standpoint of the supporting 
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evidence, and not from the appellants' view of how the facts should 
have been found. Saunders v. Sharp, 793 P. 2d 927 (Utah App. 1990). 
While Plaintiffs acknowledge and give lip service to the 
marshaling requirement (Appellants' Brief, p, 3), their Brief 
utterly fails to provide this Court with the evidence which 
supported the trial court's decision. If this Court were forced to 
decide the issues based solely upon Appellants' Brief, the Court 
would be entirely unable to determine whether or not there is any 
evidence to support the trial court's findings and decision. 
Appellants have consistently emphasized or stated only the evidence 
which supports their position, and have left it to the Court to 
determine what evidence provided the basis for the trial court's 
ruling. Therefore, the trial court's findings of fact should be 
conclusive and should not be disturbed. Bhatia v. Department of 
Employment Security, 188 Utah Adv. Rep., at 42; Horton v. Gem State 
Mutual, 794 P.2d at 849. 
Also, Appellants' Brief fails to present the evidence in the 
proper light. "Under familiar rules of appellate review, the Court 
views the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment of 
the trial court . . . . " Harllne v. Campbell, 728 P.2d, at 982; 
Bennlon v. Hansen, 699 P. 2d, at 759. The Supreme Court in Harline 
also stated, "It is incumbent upon the appellant to marshal all of 
the evidence in support of the trial court's findings and then to 
demonstrate that even when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the factual determination made by the trial court, that the 
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evidence is insufficient to support its findings." (Footnote 
omitted.) Harline, at 982. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT SHOULD BE 
AFFIRMED BECAUSE THEY WERE MADE WITH RELIANCE 
UPON SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE BEFORE THE COURT. 
The trial court in this case made numerous specific findings 
of fact (Exhibit A ) . (R. 431-433) Each of those facts is based 
upon evidence presented to the trial court by all parties. Those 
findings will not be disturbed unless there is no substantial 
record evidence to support them. Bennion, at 759. Notwithstanding 
their selective recitation of the facts, Appellants' Brief 
completely fails to carry the burden of demonstrating that the 
trial court's findings of fact were clearly erroneous. 
The trial court made 16 specific findings of fact. (R. 431-
433) Plaintiffs specifically attack findings no. 2, 3, 4, 7, 8, 10 
and 11. (Appellants' Brief, pp. 21-22, 26, 39.) Each of these 
findings of fact is supported by the following competent evidence: 
A. FINDING OF FACT NO. 2: ONE YEAR OF SERVICE WITH THE WEST 
VALLEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT WAS REQUIRED IN ORDER TO BE 
ELIGIBLE FOR PROMOTION TO SERGEANT. (R. 432) 
The fact that one year of service with West Valley City was 
required in order to qualify for promotion to Sergeant is 
unquestioned, despite Appellants' statement that, "There is no 
evidence in the record indicating that the probationary period was 
one year," (Appellants' Brief, p. 22). The June 6, 1989 memorandum 
which stated the qualifications for promotion clearly states that 
candidates "must be off probation" (Exhibit N. ) (R. 006) The 
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trial court was presented with competent evidence which indicated 
that the probationary period for West Valley City Civil Service 
employees is one year. The Civil Service Rules clearly state, in 
Rule 11-32(2), that, "All Civil Service employees shall serve a 
one-year probation." (Exhibit E.) (R. 286) Also, Cory Ervin, who 
worked in the West Valley City Personnel Office and who also served 
as Civil Service Commission Secretary, swore by Affidavit that, 
"Based upon my experience as Civil Service Secretary and Personnel 
Generalist, I have personal knowledge that Police Officers are 
required to have at least one year of service with the West Valley 
City Police Department prior to being removed from probation." 
(Exhibit G.) (R. 282-283) Appellants' Brief presents no evidence 
to dispute the existence of the one-year probationary period, and 
instead relies on the totally unsupported allegation that "a 
requirement that all candidates have one year of service with the 
Department is not adequate consideration of seniority." 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 23.) 
B. FINDING OF FACT NO. 3: THE REQUIREMENTS FOR PROMOTION TO 
SERGEANT REQUIRED THAT APPLICANTS HOLD THE RANK OF POLICE 
OFFICER WITHIN THE WEST VALLEY CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT. 
(R. 432) 
C. FINDING OF FACT NO. 4: WITHIN THE RANK OF POLICE 
OFFICER, ALL GRADES (P.O. I, P.O. II AND P.O. Ill) WERE 
ELIGIBLE FOR PROMOTION TO SERGEANT, WITH NO GRADE 
PREFERENCE GIVEN TO THE MEMBERS OF ANY ONE GRADE. 
(R. 432) 
Appellants' Brief does not directly attack the factual basis 
of these two related findings of fact, but instead argues that, 
" . . . only officers of the next lower rank, P.O. II, be allowed to 
compete for the promotion." (Appellants' Brief, p. 24.) While 
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Nordfelt and the Civil Service Commission readily agree that both 
Utah Code Ann. § 10-3-1010 and Civil Service Rule III-l (Exhibit E) 
provide that promotions should be made from the next lower rank 
when practicable, there was no evidence presented to the trial 
court that P.O. II was the next lower rank beneath Sergeant. The 
evidence presented to the trial court, which Plaintiffs have failed 
to marshal, fully supports the trial court's finding that the 
applicants for promotion to Sergeant were required to hold the rank 
of Police Officer, and that within the rank of Police Officer there 
existed three grades. The Civil Service Rules clearly 
differentiate between ranks and grades. Civil Service Rules III-2, 
III-6 and III-7 define promotions in grade and promotions in rank, 
and describe the differences between the two (Exhibit E). (R. 284-
285) Also, the Affidavit of Terry Keefe (Exhibit J ) , West Valley 
City Assistant Police Chief, sets forth the following evidence: 
4. I have personal knowledge that in 
the West Valley City Police Department the 
rank immediately below Sergeant is the rank of 
Police Officer. 
5. I have personal knowledge that only 
officers holding the rank of Police Officer 
were promoted to Sergeant following the 1989 
Promotional Examination. 
6 . I have personal knowledge that the 
rank structure in the West Valley City Police 
Department is set forth in the West Valley 
City Police Manual at Section 1700.23, and 
that a copy of this rank structure is issued 
to every officer within the Department. 
7. I have personal knowledge that 
within the rank of Police Officer there are 
three grades consisting of Police Officer I, 
Police Officer II and Police Officer III. 
8. I have personal knowledge that job 
duties within the rank of Police Officer are 
essentially similar, involve no supervisory 
duties and do not vary based upon an officer's 
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grade designation as a P.O. I, P.O. II or 
P.O. III. 
(R. 279) Section 1700.23 of the West Valley City Police Department 
Manual (Exhibit F), which is referred to in I 6 of the Affidavit of 
Terry Keefe, states: 
Rank structure is the hierarchial arrangement 
of ranks within the Department. The ranks of 
this Department are .Listed below in descending 
order: 
Police Chief 
Lieutenant 
Sergeant 
Police Officer 
(R. 277) Also, the Affidavit of Cory Ervin, Personnel Generalist 
and Civil Service Commission Secretary (Exhibit G ) , states: 
9. Based upon my experience as Civil 
Service Secretary and Personnel Generalist, I 
have personal knowledge that Police Officer is 
the rank immediately below Sergeant in the 
West Valley City Police Department. 
10. Based upon my experience as Civil 
Service Secretary and Personnel Generalist, I 
have personal knowledge that the rank of 
Police Officer in the West Valley City Police 
Department is divided into grades known as 
Police Officer I, Police Officer II and Police 
Officer III. 
(R. 282-283) 
None of this supporting evidence was marhsaled by the FOP and 
Crowley, nor do they present any evidence, other than unsupported 
allegations, which contradicts the finding of the trial court. 
Plaintiffs provide absolutely no factual basis for their argument 
that the finding of fact is wrong because the rank below Sergeant 
is the rank of P.O. II. Their argument arises from a complete 
misstatement of the rank structure within the Police Department. 
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They wrongly point to the grades of P.O. I and P.O. II as "ranks." 
These are clearly not ranks, but are grades within the rank of 
Police Officer. As set forth in the Civil Service Rules, grades 
are easily differentiated from ranks in that grade status is 
primarily related to salary level, not job duties, and a change 
from the grade of P.O. I to P.O. II requires no change in job 
duties or position within the Department (Exhibit E). (R. 284-285) 
The functions of P.O. I and P.O. II officers are the same, and one 
is not supervisory or superior to the other. (R. 279) Conversely, 
changes in rank are characterized by a substantial change in job 
duties, such as the supervisory responsibilities that differentiate 
a Sergeant from a Police Officer. (R. 285) 
By making this argument that P.O. II is a "rank," the FOP and 
Crowley have painted themselves into a corner which demonstrates 
the absurdity of their position. They completely ignore the 
existence of the P.O. Ill grade officers. The FOP and Crowley's 
failure to recognize P.O. Ill officers places them in a dilemma. 
If their argument that P.O. II grade officers constitute a "rank" 
is assumed to be correct, then they have again ignored the facts 
when they skip over P.O. Ill's and assert that the "rank" 
immediately below Sergeant is P.O. II. Under their mistaken 
version of the ranking structure the rank immediately under 
Sergeant would be P.O. III. If this were true, then Crowley is 
arguing that he is ineligible to take the Sergeants promotional 
examination since he is a P.O. II officer and would not be "from 
the next lower rank." (R. 337) 
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The FOP and Crowley surely know that P.O. II is not the "rank" 
immediately below Sergeant. Appellants are all West Valley City 
Police Officers who possess the departmental manual and Commission 
Rules which set forth the rank and grade system. They presented 
the trial court with no evidence regarding the rank structure in 
the Police Department. Clearly, this argument is not made in good 
faith. 
D. FINDING OF FACT NO. 7: PLAINTIFF CROWLEY DID NOT RECEIVE 
THE MINIMUM REQUIRED PASSING SCORE ON THE WRITTEN 
EXAMINATION AND, THEREFORE, DID NOT PROCEED FURTHER IN 
THE PROMOTIONAL PROCESS. (R. 432) 
Crowley admits that the Affidavit of Cory Ervin, Personnel 
Generalist and Civil Service Commission Secretary, provided 
evidence which supported this finding of fact (Exhibit G ) . 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 37.) Ervin stated in her Affidavit that she 
was the custodian of all records of the West Valley City Civil 
Service Commission, and that the Commission records in her 
possession indicated that the minimum passing score on the written 
examination was a score of 75 percent. She also indicated that 
Plaintiff Crowley applied for and took the written examination, but 
that he did not receive a score of 75 percent or above and, 
therefore, did not advance to the next phase of the testing 
process. (R. 185) 
Crowley fails, however, to marshal the regaining supporting 
evidence. For example, he omits his own sworn statement which 
supports this finding. As Crowley stated in his Second Affidavit, 
"I failed to pass the written examination by 1 point and was not 
allowed to proceed to the next level of consideration." (R. 338) 
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Crowley attempts to demonstrate that this finding of fact is 
clearly erroneous by directing the Court's attention to the 
promotional examination announcements, which he asserts are better 
evidence than Ervin's sworn statement. Based on the two 
promotional announcement memoranda, Crowley now argues that there 
was no minimum passing score and that the top 15 scores on the 
written examination would advance to the assessment center, 
(Appellants' Brief, p. 37.) This is patently untrue, as can be 
demonstrated by examining the documents upon which he relies. The 
June 6, 19 89 memorandum announcing the promotional examination for 
Sergeant clearly and unequivocally states in 5 1, line 3, that, 
"Passing grade for all tests will be set at 75%." (Exhibit N. ) 
(R. 006) Also, on the second page of the June 6 memorandum, under 
the heading "Assessment Center," appears the following statement: 
"Only the top 15 candidates (with a passing score) on the written 
examination will be invited to attend a two-day assessment center." 
(Emphasis added.) (R. 007) The documents cited by Crowley support 
the finding of fact. 
Crowley produced no evidence or argument before the trial 
court that the minimum passing score was not 75 percent. 
E. FINDING OF FACT NO. 8: PLAINTIFF CROWLEY DID NOT SUFFER 
A DISTINCT, PARTICULARIZED AND PALPABLE INJURY RELATED TO 
THE CONDUCT OF DEFENDANTS. (R. 432) 
This finding of fact is supported by the same evidence which 
supports the other findings of fact related to Plaintiff Crowley. 
Crowley believes that, "The trial court's misperception that a 
minimum passing score existed is the primary reason that finding 
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no. 8 is erroneous." (Appellants' Brief, p. 38.) As was shown in 
H D above ("Finding of Fact No. 7"), the trial court's finding that 
Crowley did not receive the minimum required passing score of 75 
percent on the written examination is supported by evidence 
contained in the Record. 
In attacking this finding of fact, Crowley makes the 
additional argument that he has established evidence of injury by 
alleging that seniority was not considered in the promotional 
process. He provided the court with absolutely no evidence to 
support this bare allegation, and his citations to the Record are 
simply to where the same allegation is made in the original 
Complaint, the Amended Complaint and his Affidavit. (Appellants' 
Brief, p. 38; R. 6-9, 113-118, 339.) While Crowley admits that, 
"Seniority may be considered in myriad ways" (Appellants' Brief, p. 
38), he completely ignores the court's finding of fact and the 
evidence which supports it, which clearly indicates that one year 
of service (seniority) with the West Valley City Police Department 
was required as a threshold qualification for entering the 
examination process. Crowley has provided this Court with no basis 
upon which it can find that finding of fact no. 8 is clearly 
erroneous. 
F. FINDING OF FACT NO. 10: MEMBERS OF PLAINTIFF ASSOCIATION 
FRATERNAL ORDER OF POLICE LODGE #4 ("FOP") DID NOT SUFFER 
DISTINCT, PARTICULARIZED AND PALPABLE INJURY RELATED TO 
THE CONDUCT OF DEFENDANTS. (R. 433) 
Plaintiff FOP attempts to demonstrate that this finding of 
fact is clearly erroneous by providing the Court with a laundry 
list of the allegations contained in their Complaint. (Appellants' 
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Brief, pp. 24-26.) Conclusory allegations not supported by 
specific facts are not sufficient to meet the standing test 
requirement of a particularized injury, York v. Unqualified 
Washington County Elected Officials, 714 P. 2d 679 (Utah 1986). 
Despite conducting discovery and having multiple opportunities to 
present evidence to the trial court, the FOP produced virtually no 
evidence to support its standing to bring this action. To the 
contrary, Defendants provided the trial court with evidence upon 
which it could base its decision that the FOP did not suffer an 
injury that would provide it with standing in this case. 
Much of the evidence, which has been set out previously in 
support of the other challenged findings of fact, support this 
finding. For example, the fact that one year of service was 
required in the testing process provides the Court with a basis for 
determining that the FOP was not injured through the lack or the 
use of seniority in the testing process. Also, the evidence 
clearly established and the trial court found that the rank 
immediately below Sergeant is the rank of Police Officer. That 
evidence supports the court's determination that the FOP was not 
injured when all three grades within the rank of Police Officer 
were allowed to compete for promotion. Virtually all of the 
remaining allegations regarding injuries suffered by the FOP relate 
back to the seniority and rank issues for which they can provide no 
factual support. 
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Plaintiff FOP has failed to provide this Court with any 
evidence upon which it could find trial court's finding of fact no. 
10 to be clearly erroneous. 
G. FINDING OF FACT NO. 11: PLAINTIFF FOP DID NOT PRESENT 
ITS CLAIMS TO THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION PRIOR TO THE 
COMMENCEMENT OF THIS LAWSUIT. (R. 433) 
As the FOP and Crowley's Brief acknowledges, the Affidavit of 
Cory Ervin establishes that as custodian of the records of the 
Civil Service Commission she has no knowledge or record of the 
Commission receiving any communication from Plaintiff FOP regarding 
the 1989 Sergeants examination, nor does she have any record or 
knowledge of the Commission transmitting any information to the FOP 
regarding the examination, with the exception of information 
supplied in connection with this lawsuit (Exhibit G) . (R. 184-186) 
Appellant FOP now makes the strained argument that the August 
23, 1989, letter to the Civil Service Commission, which was signed 
by a group of officers, constituted an appearance by the FOP, This 
argument is made despite the fact that the letter itself is not on 
FOP letterhead, nor does the body of the letter contain any 
representation whatsoever that the officers are acting as the FOP, 
on behalf of the FOP or are even all members of the FOP. (R. 010) 
Even Crowley, President of the FOP, simply states the following in 
his Affidavit: 
19. I signed a letter to the Commission 
objecting to the procedure followed in the 
Sergeants promotion evaluation process. 
(R. 339) The fact that Crowley does not indicate that the letter 
was signed in his capacity as FOP President, as a FOP member or in 
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any manner on behalf of the FOP is a clear indication that the 
August 23, 1989 letter was submitted to the Commission on behalf of 
the individual officers who signed the letter. This comports with 
the language of the letter itself, where the officers simply refer 
to themselves as "we the undersigned officers of West Valley City." 
(R. 010) Although many or all of the signees of the letter may 
have been FOP members, that certainly does not make it an action of 
the FOP as is now being suggested. 
Plaintiff FOP makes a sidebar argument that there existed no 
process by which the FOP could have improprieties in the testing 
process reviewed by the Civil Service Commission. This argument is 
obviously absurd, since the 30 officers who signed the August 23, 
1989 letter did successfully bring alleged improprieties to the 
Commission and received a response from the Commission following 
the Commission's investigation. (R. 10-13) By making this 
argument, the FOP is in the ludicrous position of simultaneously 
arguing that no process exists for presenting claims to the 
Commission, and that they did, in fact, present their claim to the 
Commission. 
The Affidavit of Cory Ervin supplies support for the court's 
finding of fact, and Plaintiff FOP has provided this Court with no 
evidence from which it could find that finding of fact no. 11 is 
clearly erroneous. 
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POINT III 
PLAINTIFF FOP DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING 
THIS SUIT IN ITS REPRESENTATIVE CAPACITY SINCE 
THERE EXIST OBVIOUS CONFLICTS AMONG ITS 
MEMBERS. 
The test to determine whether or not an association such as 
Plaintiff FOP has standing to bring an action in its representative 
capacity is set forth in two Utah cases, Utah Restaurant 
Association v. Davis County Board of Health, 709 P.2d 1159 (Utah 
1985), and Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 
1166 (Utah 1987). These two decisions follow the association 
standing test set by the United States Supreme Court in Warth v. 
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 45 L.Ed.2d 343, 95 S. Ct. 2197 (1975). The 
three cases mentioned above set forth a two-prong test for 
determining when an association can represent its members in court. 
The first prong of the test is that the individual members of the 
association must have standing to sue. The second prong of the 
test is that the nature of the claim and of the relief sought does 
not require the individual participation of each injured party. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in its cases adopting the Warth test, 
provides insight as to what is necessary to meet this standing 
test. Specifically with respect to the second prong of the test, 
the relief sought by the association must not require the 
individual participation of each injured party. The court, in 
Society of Professional Journalists, found that the Society met the 
second prong of the test, since " . . . the relief it sought would 
have benefitted all its members . . . . " (emphasis added); and, 
" . • . the association was fully capable of presenting to the 
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district court the factual and legal access issues about which its 
members were concerned." Society of Professional Journalists, at 
1175. In the Utah Restaurant case, the Supreme Court found the 
plaintiff association to have met the second prong of the test 
because, "The questions raised as to the validity of the Board's 
enactment are common to all Davis County members of the 
Association" (emphasis added); and, "Nothing suggests that their 
individual interests will not be adequately protected . . . . " 
Utah Restaurant Association, at 1163. 
In this case, individual members of the FOP have diverse 
interests which create internal conflicts such that the FOP cannot 
represent all of its members. The courts have consistently held 
that this second prong of the association standing test cannot be 
met when conflicts of interest exist within an association. The 
action then cannot be for the common good or benefit of all members 
of the association. For example, the United States Supreme Court 
found that a women's association lacked standing with regard to 
Medicaid abortions because of a diversity of views within the 
membership of the association. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 321 
(1980). The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals denied standing to a 
contractors' association and stated: 
Moreover, the claim asserted requires the 
participation of the individual members of the 
association. The association is clearly not 
in a position to speak for its members . . . . 
Their status and interests are too diverse and 
the possibilities of conflict too obvious to 
make the association an appropriate vehicle to 
litigate the claims of its members . . . . 
Some stand to benefit from working on the 
project under the agreement and still others 
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will be heard by not being able to do so . . . 
It is for the court, not the members of the 
association, to determine whether their 
interests require individual representation. 
Here in view of the actual and potential 
conflicts, they clearly do. 
Associated General Contractors v. Otter Tail Power Company, 611 
F.2d 6 84, 691 (1979) (footnote omitted; emphasis added). 
An excellent discussion of the effects of conflicts within an 
association is found at 13 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction 2d § 3531,9, at 617-623 
(1984) (Exhibit 0). 
In this case, Appellant FOP is acting as a arepresentative for 
its members, the West Valley City Police Officers. This is 
precisely the type of association that is subject to the test set 
forth in the Utah Restaurant and Society of Professional 
Journalists cases. The 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss brought by 
Nordfelt and the Civil Service Commission attacked the standing of 
the FOP, both on the face of the Complaint and factually. The 
trial court correctly found that, under either type of attack, the 
FOP failed to meet the minimum requirements for association 
standing. 
When a complaint is attacked on its face, the court assumes 
the facts as set forth in the complaint to be true. Mortensen v. 
First Federal Savings and Loan, 549 F.2d, at 891. Even given this 
advantage, the FOP failed to meet the test. The original Complaint 
and the Amended Complaints are devoid of any allegation regarding 
individual members of the FOP having the capacity to bring this 
action, nor do they describe specific damage to any FOP member. 
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(R. 2-14, 73-77, 113-118) Also, the FOP fails to allege that this 
action can be prosecuted by the FOP without requiring the 
individual participation of its members. All of these elements are 
necessary and their lack of pleading makes the FOP's Complaint 
defective on its face, as was found by the trial court, (R. 411-
412, 431-437) 
The FOP's standing was also attacked on a purely factual 
basis. When attacked in this manner, the FOP's Complaint is given 
no deferential treatment. The Court may investigate the facts to 
determine if jurisdiction exists, and the burden to prove 
jurisdiction is on the party asserting it. Adams v. Bain, 697 
F.2d, at 1219; Mortensen, at 891, As was found by the trial court, 
the facts support a finding that the FOP cannot meet the minimum 
standing requirements of the association test. 
The FOP clearly cannot meet the second prong of the test, 
which requires that the action not require the individual 
participation of members of the association. Courts consistently 
deny standing where there are conflicts of interest within the 
association itself. In this case, the trial court correctly found 
that there were clear conflicts. (R. 411-412, 431-437) This case 
falls squarely within the example provided by Justice Stewart, when 
he stated that, " . . . individual participation may be required if 
conflicts of interest exist between the members of an association." 
Society of Professional Journalists, at 1182. (J. Stewart 
Dissent. ) 
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The most dramatic example of this conflict lies on the very 
face of the Complaint itself, where Nordfelt, a dues-paying FOP 
member in good standing, was made a defendant (Exhibit K) . (R. 
002, 176, 186) The FOP sued one of its own members and put itself 
in the absurd position of claiming to be suing in its 
representative capacity, when it has members as both plaintiffs and 
defendants in the same case. 
Also, the trial court found in finding of fact no. 14 (R. 433) 
that the FOP was put in a position of deposing its own members as 
hostile witnesses. (R. 47-48, 50-51, 59-62, 92-93, 175-176, 178, 
186, 189) The testing process which is being disputed was 
formulated and administered by members of the FOP. (R. 178, 189) 
(Finding of fact No. 12, R. 433) The allegations of improper 
actions during the testing process necessarily means that the FOP 
is alleging that it was wronged by its own members who approved and 
administered the test. Those officers, Defendant Chief Nordfelt, 
who approved the test, and Assistant Chief J. Steven Shreeve and 
Lieutenant Larry L. Moody, who formulated and administered the 
Sergeant's test, were deposed by the FOP. (R. 59-60, 92-93, 178, 
189) Even the FOP recognized the conflict by refusing to provide 
Shreeve and Moody with legal counsel during the depositions (R. 
178, 189), and, in the case of Shreeve, specifically telling him 
that it would not provide him with legal counsel at the deposition 
due to a "conflict of interest." (R. 189) Both Shreeve and Moody 
are dues-paying FOP members in good standing (Exhibits H and I). 
(R. 178, 186, 189) 
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Also, if the FOP is successful in nullifying the 1989 
Sergeant's test and resulting promotions, the result would be 
dramatic, adverse consequences to certain individual members of the 
FOP association, FOP members Charles Illsley, Guy Dodge and Craig 
Gibson were promoted to the rank of Sergeant as a result of the 
1989 test. The trial court found, in finding of fact no. 13, that 
the FOP members will lose rank, pay and benefits if the FOP 
successfully nullifies the promotions. All three individuals are 
dues-paying members of the FOP (Exhibits L and M) . (R. 181, 183, 
186) Finally, the FOP has produced no evidence that would indicate 
that, if it is not granted standing, the issues are not likely to 
be raised at all or that the issues are so unique and important 
than an exception should be made to the standing test. To the 
contrary, there are obviously other Plaintiffs (Crowley) and 
potential Plaintiffs (Salmon and Shopay) who are willing to take 
action. 
An association with internal conflicts of interest simply 
cannot meet the standing test. The trial court correctly found 
that the FOP failed the second prong of the association standing 
test, since there are serious, obvious conflicts of interest within 
the FOP and it cannot act for the benefit or common good of all of 
its members. The FOP lacks standing both on the face of the 
Complaint itself and upon the facts of the case as found by the 
trial court. 
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POINT IV 
APPELLANT CROWLEY SUFFERED NO INJURY, AND, 
THEREFORE, DOES NOT HAVE STANDING TO BRING 
THIS ACTION AS AN INDIVIDUAL. 
In order to carry his burden of proof that he had the 
necessary standing to bring this action, Appellant Crowley had to 
provide the court with evidence demonstrating that he has suffered 
a distinct and palpable injury that gives him a personal stake in 
the outcome of the legal dispute. Jenkins v. Swan, 675 P.2d 1145 
(Utah 1983); Wade v. Burke, 800 P.2d 1106 (Utah App. 1990). Also, 
there must be a causal relationship between any injury to Crowley 
and the actions of Nordfelt and the Civil Service Commission. 
The Utah Supreme Court discussed the standing test at length 
in the Jenkins case, and stated: 
. . . this Court will not readily rsalieve a 
plaintiff of the salutory [sic] requirement of 
showing a real and personal interest in the 
dispute. . . . the inquiry will be directed to 
the traditional criteria of the plaintiff's 
personal stake in the controversy. One who is 
adversely affected by governmental actions has 
standing under this criterion. One who is not 
adversely affected has no standing. A mere 
allegation of an adverse impact is not 
sufficient. There must also be some causal 
relationship alleged between the injury to the 
plaintiff, the governmental actions and the 
relief requested. 
Jenkins, at 1150. 
This test requires an injury particular to the plaintiff by 
virtue of the claimed wrong, not a general injury. Absent a claim 
of specific injury related to the alleged illegal activity, this 
standing test has not been met. Jenkins, at 1151. 
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The 12(b)(1) Motion to Dismiss brought by Nordfelt and the 
Civil Service Commission attacked Crowley's standing both on the 
face of the Complaint and factually. The Complaint and the Amended 
Complaints are devoid of any allegations that Crowley received a 
particularized injury, or that any injury was caused by the actions 
of Nordfelt and the Civil Service Commission. (R. 2-14, 73-77, 
113-118) Therefore, the trial court correctly found that the 
Complaint, on its face, failed to establish Crowley's standing to 
sue. (R. 411-412, 431-437) 
Crowley's standing was also attacked factually. The facts, as 
found by the trial court, support a finding that Crowley cannot 
satisfy either factor required in Jenkins. Crowley took the 1989 
Sergeant's promotional written examination, which required a 
minimum score of 75 percent to advance to the next level of 
testing. (R. 006, 186) As Crowley admits in his Second Affidavit, 
he failed to reach the required score of 75 percent on the written 
section of the examination, and, therefore, did not proceed further 
in the testing and was not listed on the promotional roster. 
(R. 338) He has not alleged, nor is it conceivable, how he 
suffered a particularized injury in this case. Even if the court 
assumes that Crowley suffered an injury in failing the test, it is 
clear that there is no causal relationship between any injury he 
may have suffered and any alleged improper action by the Commission 
or Nordfelt. Crowley's failure on the written examination was 
solely the result of his personal knowledge, ability and effort in 
taking the examination. Even if the actions complained of in the 
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Complaint were true, none of those actions affected Crowley's 
performance on the written test. The alleged improper actions by 
Nordfelt and the Civil Service Commission did not and could not 
affect Crowley's test score one iota. 
In his brief, Crowley makes two arguments to assert his 
standing. First, in the face of overwhelming evidence, including 
his own Affidavit, he makes the allegation that there was no 
minimum passing score on the written examination. As was 
demonstrated earlier on pages 24 and 25 of this brief, that 
argument simply has no factual support. 
Crowley's second argument is based upon the notion that he has 
standing because he is a member of a class which has an interest in 
the proper administration of the Civil Service Rules. He then 
relies on a non-standing case, Hayward v. Pennock, 444 P. 2d 59 
(Utah 1968), to advance the rationale that all officers have an 
interest in proper administration of the Civil Service Rules. In 
fact, Hayward recognizes, in the quote provided by Plaintiffs, that 
this is an interest shared by both "employees and the public." 
Hayward, at 60. This type of general interest or grievance cannot 
form the basis for standing before the court. 
An attempt to confer standing by merely having a general 
interest common to the public or a class of individuals is exactly 
the type of case that the "distinct and palpable injury" test is 
designed to screen out. The United States Supreme Court has held 
that: 
Petitioners must allege and show that they 
personally have been injured, not that injury 
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has been suffered by other, unidentified 
members of the class to which they belong and 
which they purport to represent. Unless these 
petitioners can thus demonstrate the requisite 
case or controversy between themselves 
personally and respondents, "none may seek 
relief on behalf of himself or any other 
member of the class." 
Warth, at 502 (emphasis added). 
The Warth court also stated that: 
the Court has held that when the 
asserted harm is a "generalized grievance" 
shared in substantially equal measure by all 
or a large class of citizens, that harm alone 
normally does not warrant exercise of 
jurisdiction. 
Warth, at 499. In Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War, 418 
U.S. 208, 41 L.Ed.2d 706, 94 S. Ct. 2925 (1974), the Supreme Court 
expressed its reluctance to entertain "generalized grievances about 
the conduct of Government," and also, in defining the type of 
injury required to establish standing, stated flatly that, 
"Abstract injury is not enough." Schlesinger, 418 U.S., at 220. 
The Utah Supreme Court also rejected the generalized grievance 
argument and held that it is generally insufficient for the 
plaintiff to assert a general interest. Jenkins, at 1149. The 
Court has also stated that, ". . . this Court will not lightly 
dispense with the requirement that a litigant have a personal stake 
in the outcome of a specific dispute." Terracor v. Utah Board of 
State Lands, 716 P.2d 796 (Utah 1986). Also, conclusory 
allegations which are not supported by specific facts which show 
injury do not meet the standing test. York v. Unqualified 
Washington County Elected Officials, 714 P.2d 679 (Utah 1986). 
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Finally, Crowley has produced no evidence that would indicate 
that if he is not granted standing, then these issues will not be 
raised or that the issues are so unique and important than an 
exception to the standing test should be made. Obviously, there 
are other Plaintiffs (FOP) and potential Plaintiffs (Salmon and 
Shopay) who are willing to tak€> action, Crowley's contention that 
he meets the exception criteria of the Jenkins case is not well 
founded or supported. 
Crowley failed to carry his burden of providing the trial 
court with facts which form a basis for his standing before the 
court. Furthermore, such facts simply do not exist. The trial 
court correctly found that both on the face of the Complaint and 
upon the facts, as investigated and found by the trial court, 
Crowley did not have standing to bring this action. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN APPLYING THE 
EXTRAORDINARY WRIT STANDING TEST. 
The Complaint filed by the FOP and Crowley is clearly in the 
nature of the now abolished writ of mandamus. It asked the court 
to order a lower board, the Civil Service Commission, and a public 
officer, the Police Chief, to take certain actions. Rule 65B of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (1988) (Exhibit D) provides that 
there shall be no special forms of writ such as writs of mandamus. 
Rule 65B provides a remedy to replace the writ of mandamus, and 
specifies that it shall be commenced by complaint. Courts have 
traditionally treated appeals from decisions of civil service 
commissions as being governed by Rule 65B. For example, Lee v. 
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Provo City Civil Service Commission, 582 P. 2d 485 (Utah 1978); 
Child v. Salt Lake City Civil Service Commission, 575 P. 2d 195 
(Utah 1978). The trial court correctly applied the extraordinary 
writ standing test as an alternative standing test, and determined 
that the FOP and Crowley could not meet the minimum standing 
requirements. 
The Utah Supreme Court has determined that the standing 
requirements necessary to obtain review of a lower board decision 
under Rule 65B are the following: 
1. The plaintiff has standing before the lower body. 
2. A ruling by the lower body was adverse to the plaintiff. 
3. The plaintiff presented the claim to the lower body. 
The court stated that if a plaintiff fails to establish any one of 
those requirements, the Rule 65B claim will not be considered. 
Society of Professional Journalists, at 1172. 
Based upon the findings and conclusions discussed earlier in 
this brief, Appellant FOP cannot meet the first two prongs of this 
test. If the FOP has no standing to appear before the trial court 
as a plaintiff, it follows that it would have not standing to 
appear before the Appellee Civil Service Commission. Also, the 
ruling of the Commission was not adverse to the FOP. Some members 
of the FOP association, those promoted or high on the roster, were 
not adversely affected by rulings of the Commission. However, it 
is the third prong of the test which the FOP obviously cannot meet. 
The trial court correctly found that the FOP had not presented its 
claim to the Commission. (Finding of fact no. 11; R. 433) The 
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only evidence presented to the trial court on this issue supported 
that finding. Also, the Supreme Court has denied standing to a 
party on an appeal because the party failed to take action at the 
administrative level. S & G v. Morgan, 191 P. 2d 1086 (Utah 1990). 
Appellant Crowley also fails to meet the Society of 
Professional Journalists' Rule 65B test. Crowley does not meet the 
first or second prongs of the test. Based upon the same rationale 
set forth above regarding his individual jurisdiction before this 
Court, Crowley also lacks standing to proceed before the 
Commission. He simply did not suffer a particularized injury as a 
result of the Commission's or Police Chief's actions. Also, as set 
forth above, the rulings of the Commission were not adverse to 
Crowley. Neither the Commission nor the Chief in any way affected 
Crowley's performance on the written examination. 
POINT VI 
APPEAL OF THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF SALMON 
AND SHOPAY'S MOTION FOR JOINDER IS NOT 
PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT# AND SAID MOTION 
WAS PROPERLY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
This Court cannot consider the trial court's denial of William 
Salmon and David Shopay's Motion for Joinder, since Salmon and 
Shopay are not parties to this appeal. Standing to prosecute an 
appeal must be based upon an interest in the trial court's decision 
which is "direct, immediate and substantial." Creamer v. Bucyr 700 
P. 2d 668, 670 (Okla. App. 1985). The only parties below which 
chose to file an appeal were the FOP and Crowley (R. 439-440), and 
they have no standing to assert the rights of other parties who 
choose not to file an appeal. 
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It is clear that an appellant cannot prosecute an appeal on an 
issue which is not adverse to the appellant. Utility Contractors 
Association of New Jersey, Inc. v. Toops, 507 F.2d 83, 86 (3rd Cir. 
1974); International Brother of Teamsters, Chaffeurs, Stablemen and 
Helpers of America, Local Union No. 523, of Tulsa, Oklahoma, v. 
Keystone Freight Lines, Inc., 123 F.2d 326 (10th Cir. 1941). As 
the Supreme Court has stated, "Only parties to a decree can appeal. 
If a party to the suit is in no manner affected by what is decreed, 
he cannot be said to be a party to the decree." Farmers' Loan and 
Trust Co., 106 U.S. 265, 269 (1982). Whether or not Salmon and 
Shopay are joined as parties in this case has absolutely no affect 
upon the Court's decision as to whether or not the FOP and Crowley 
have standing. There are few cases upon this procedural issue and 
no Utah cases, but the rationale is clear. As the Third Circuit 
stated in the Utility Contractors case, "This small point of 
appellate procedure has not often been litigated, probably because 
it is so elementary." Utility Contractors, at 85. 
Assuming arguendo, that the court determines it is proper to 
rule upon the propriety of the trial court's denial of Salmon and 
Shopay's Motion for Joinder, it is clear that the trial court's 
decision was correct. First, the cases establish that standing is 
an issue which directly affects the subject matter jurisdiction of 
a court to hear a lawsuit. Heath Techna Corporation v. Sound 
Systems International, 588 P.2d 169, 170 (Utah 1978). If the trial 
court finds that the original plaintiff does not have standing, 
then dismissal of the case is the only action available to the 
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court. Rule 12(h)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure clearly 
mandates that whenever it appears that a court does not have 
subject matter jurisdiction, then, " . . . the court shall dismiss 
the action." (Exhibit C.) (Emphasis added.) Also, the cases are 
clear that when a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, its 
authority extends no further than to dismiss the action. 
Deschenes v. King County, 521 P. 2d 1181 (Wash. 1974); Mlnter-Wilson 
Drilling Company, Inc. v. Randall, 675 P. 2d 365 (Kan, 1984). 
Perhaps the most concise statement regarding this area of law 
was made by the Supreme Court of Wyoming in Matter of Contempt 
Order (Anderson), 765 P. 2d 933 (Wyo. 1988), when the court stated: 
It is fundamental, if not axiomatic, that, 
before a court can render any decision or 
order having any effect in any case or matter, 
it must have subject matter jurisdiction. 
(Citation omitted.) Jurisdiction is essential 
to the exercise of judicial power. (Citation 
omitted.) Once the court has jurisdiction, it 
lacks any authority to proceed, and any 
decision, judgment or other order is, as a 
matter of law, utterly void and of no effect 
for any purpose. 
Matter of Contempt Order (Anderson), at 936. These cases are 
consistent with Rule 12(h)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
(Exhibit C ) . 
When the trial court determined that the FOP and Crowley did 
not have standing, then the court had no jurisdiction to grant the 
Motion for Joinder of potential plaintiffs, Salmon and Shopay. 
Salmon and Shopay were always free to file their own action against 
the Defendants; however, they cannot join a nonexisting lawsuit and 
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thereby bootstrap the action into a position of potential 
jurisdiction. 
It was within the discretion of the trial court and based upon 
sound legal principles that the Motion for Joinder was denied. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons advanced above, the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order of the trial court should be 
affirmed in all respects. 
DATED this 2<*T day of J>ZPT£MBI/£ , 1992. 
L <a 
J.f Richard Catten 
AtWrney for Defendants/Appellees 
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Trial Court Ruling 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER 
OF POLICE LODGE #4, a 
nonprofit corporation, and 
JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
City Chief of Police, and 
WEST VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
COURT'S RULING 
CIVIL NO. 890907667 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is granted. The Court finds 
that the plaintiffs, who have the burden of establishing 
standing, have not established standing to bring this lawsuit. 
The facts set forth in the Complaint fail to establish that 
the plaintiff, Jim Crowley, has personally suffered some 
distinct, particularized and palpable injury that is related to 
defendants' conduct. The Court further finds that the 
individual members of the Fraternal Order of Police must have 
standing, and FOP likewise lacks standing. There is no showing 
that the members of FOP have particularized specific injuries 
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that were presented in a claim to the lower body. Further, it 
appears clear, that conflicts of interest exist within the 
association and its members. The standard for examining 
standing, set forth in Society of Professional Journalists v. 
Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166 (Utah 1987), and Utah Restaurant Assoc, 
v. Davis Co, Bd. of Health, 709 P. 2d 1159 (Utah 1985), makes it 
clear that these plaintiffs have no standing on the face of the 
Complaint and on a closer examination of the facts of the case. 
Defendants' Motion to Strike plaintiffs' supplemental 
memorandum is denied. 
The Complaint in this matter is dismissed. The motion for 
joinder is denied, 
Mr. Catten to prepare detailed Findings and an Order for 
the Court's signature. 
Dated this /v-^  day of November, 1991*^ '—-
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, 
this /O day of November, 1991: 
J. D. Conder 
K. C. Bennett 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
4059 South 4000 West 
West Valley City, Utah 84120 
J. Richard Catten 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorney for Defendants 
3 600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, Utah 84119 
k~ It K. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER 
OF POLICE LODGE #4, 
a nonprofit Utah corporation, 
AND JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
City Chief of Police, AND WEST 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
DECISION AND ORDER 
Civil No. 89-0907667 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
The Court, upon review of the pleadings, memoranda, 
affidavits, authorities and arguments of the parties, and being 
fully advised in the premises, hereby makes and enters the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, Decision and Order 
with respect to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, Defendants' Motion 
to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, and the Motion for Joinder. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On or about July 20, 1989, West Valley City conducted a 
promotional examination for the position of Sergeant in the West 
Valley City Police Department. 
2. One year of service with the West Valley City Police 
Department was required in order to be eligible for promotion to 
Sergeant. 
3. The requirements for promotion to Sergeant required that 
applicants hold the rank of Police Officer within the West Valley 
City Police Department. 
4. Within the rank of Police Officer, all grades (POI, POII 
and POIII) were eligible for promotion to Sergeant with no 
preference being given to the members of any one grade. 
5. On or about March 28, 1991, FOP members William Salmon 
and David Shopay filed a Motion for Joinder as additional 
Plaintiffs in this action. 
6. Plaintiff Jim Crowley participated in the written 
examination portion of the Sergeant promotional process. 
7. Plaintiff Jim Crowley did not receive the minimum 
required passing score on the written examination and, therefore, 
did not proceed further in the promotional process. 
8. Plaintiff Jim Crowley did not suffer a distinct, 
particularized and palpable injury related to the conduct of 
Defendants. 
9. The Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4 (FOP) is an 
association consisting of a majority of the officers of the West 
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Valley City Police Department, including both officers who 
participated in the Sergeant promotional process and officers who 
did not. 
10. Members of the FOP did not suffer distinct, 
particularized and palpable injury related to the conduct of 
Defendants. 
11. Plaintiff FOP did not present its claims to the Civil 
Service Commission prior to commencement of this lawsuit. 
12. Members of the FOP were involved in formulating and 
conducting the Sergeant promotional process. 
13. Members of the FOP would lose their promotion to Sergeant 
should Plaintiff FOP's action be successful. 
14. Members of the FOP were deposed as adverse witnesses by 
Plaintiffs. 
15. Defendant Dennis Nordfelt was a member of the FOP at the 
time the action was filed and until October, 1991. 
16. On or about August 23, 1991, this matter was orally 
argued before the Court. Subsequent to that argument, Plaintiffs 
submitted a Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss. Defendants thereupon filed a Motion to Strike 
Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby 
enters the following Conclusions of Law: 
1. Plaintiffs appearing before the Court must have standing 
in order to bring a lawsuit. 
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2. The burden of establishing standing is upon the 
plaintiffs. 
3. To establish standing, individual plaintiffs must show 
that they have personally suffered some distinct, particularized 
and palpable injury that is related to the defendant's conduct. 
4. To establish standing, plaintiff associations must show 
that individual members of the association have suffered distinct, 
particularized and palpable injuries related to the defendant's 
conduct, thereby showing that individual members of the association 
have s tanding. 
5. To establish standing, plaintiff associations must show 
that the action does not require individual participation of the 
members of the association. This standard is not met if conflicts 
of interest exist within and between the association and its 
members. 
6. To establish standing, plaintiffs who challenge or seek 
review of the actions or orders of a lower commission must show 
that: 
a) the plaintiff had standing before the appropriate 
lower body; 
b) the plaintiff presented the claim to the lower 
body; 
c) a ruling by the lower body was adverse to the 
plaintiff. 
1. Plaintiff Crowley has failed, both on the face of the 
complaint and on the facts of the case, to meet his burden to 
4 
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establish that he suffered a distinct, particularized and palpable 
injury related to the conduct of Defendants, and therefore does not 
have standing in this case. 
8. Plaintiff FOP has failed, both on the face of the 
complaint and on the facts of the case, to meet its burden to 
establish that individual members of the FOP suffered distinct, 
particularized and palpable injuries related to the conduct of 
Defendants, and therefore does not have standing in this case, 
9. Plaintiff FOP has failed, both on the face of the 
complaint and on the facts of the case, to meet its burden to 
establish that the FOP presented its claims to the Civil Service 
Commission, and therefore does not have standing in this case, 
10. Plaintiff FOP has conflicts within and between the 
association and its members that preclude the association from 
representing its members and requires the individual participation 
of the members of the association, and therefore does not have 
standing in this case. 
11. Standing is an issue of subject matter jurisdiction. 
12. The Court's determination that Plaintiff FOP and 
Plaintiff Crowley do not have standing and the subsequent dismissal 
of their complaint renders William Salmon and David Shopay's Motion 
for Joinder moot. 
13. It is within the discretion of the Court to accept 
supplemental memoranda and affidavits provided by the parties. 
5 
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DECISION 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law, it is the decision of the Court that Plaintiff FOP and 
Plaintiff Jim Crowley have not established standing necessary to 
bring this lawsuit- Based upon the facts set forth in the 
complaint, and upon a close examination of the facts of the case, 
the Court finds that Plaintiff Jim Crowley has not personally 
suffered a distinct, particularized and palpable injury related to 
Defendants' conduct which would provide him with standing in this 
case. The Court further finds that Plaintiff FOP has not 
established that individual members of the FOP have suffered 
distinct, particularized and palpable injuries related to 
Defendants' conduct. The Court further finds that clear conflicts 
of interest exist within and between the FOP association and its 
members, which prevent it from meeting the established criteria for 
standing of an association. In addition, the Court finds that the 
FOP has failed to present its claims to the appropriate lower body, 
the Civil Service Commission. 
It is the decision of the Court to accept Plaintiffs' 
Supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion to 
Dismiss. 
It is the Decision of the Court to deny the Motion for Joinder 
since the Court has determined that Plaintiffs lack standing and 
the Court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction over the action. 
-6-
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ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law 
and Decision: 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
Defendants' Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendants' Motion to Dismiss is denied. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Defendants' 
Motion to Dismiss is granted, and that the complaint in this matter 
is dismissed without prejudice. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the Motion 
for Joinder is denied. 
MADE and ENTERED this of "^V^M^. i! 
uP&kj^f Leslie A. Lewis 
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Exhibit C: Rule 12, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
Rule 12 Defenses and objections. 
(a) When p re sen t ed A defendant ^hall ^eive his answer within twent\ 
dav s after tb< ^ i \ ice of the summon and complaint 1^  complete unless other 
w ise e\pi< s 1\ pro\ ided b\ statute 01 JI d( » of the eoui t A p n t\ -ei ved w ith a 
pleading S i t i n g a eioss claim agairw 1 im shall serve an MISWCI thereto 
within twentv davs after the service upon h m I he plaintiff ^hall ser\e hi^ 
replv to a counter claim m the answer w ithin twenty da\ s aft( i sei vice of the 
answer or i farepl> is ordered bv, tire court w ithin twenty da\ s after service 
of the 01 dei unless the order other w i^e dir ects The ser \ ice of a motion under 
this i ule alter s these per lods of time as follows unless a differ cnt time is fixed 
by order of the court 
(1) If the court denies the motion or postpones its disposition until the 
trial on the merits, the r e s p o n s e pleading shall be served within ten 
da>s after notice of the courts action 
(2) If the court grants a motion for a more definite statement the 
responsive pleading shall be seived within ten days after the service of 
the moie definite statement 
(b) Hov\ p r e s e n t e d Every defense in law oi fact to claim for relief in an) 
pleading whether a claim c o u n t e u l u m cross claim oi third oartv claim 
h ill b( i^iMcd ri the ie^pon^ivc pK di tK r c to if one i^  c in d ( \cept 
that the following defenses may at the option of the pleader oe made by 
motion (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction 
over the person, (3) improper venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insuffi-
ciency of service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, (7) failuie to join an indispensable party A motion making any of 
these defenses shall be made before pleading if a further pleading is permit-
ted No defense or objection is waived by being joined with one or more other 
defenses or objections in a responsive pleading or motion or by further plead-
ing after the denial of such motion or objection If a pleading sets forth a claim 
for relief to which the adverse party is not required to serve a responsive 
pleading, he may assert at the trial any defense in law or fact to t ha t claim for 
relief If, on a motion asserting the defense numbered (6) to dismiss for failure 
of the pleading to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, mat ters 
outside the pleading are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56 
(c) Motion for judgment on the p l ead ings . After the pleadings are closed 
but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judg-
ment on the pleadings If, on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, mat ters 
outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the 
motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as 
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to 
present all material made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56 
(d) Preliminary hearings. The defenses specifically enumerated (l)-(7) in 
subdivision (b) of this rule, whether made in a pleading or by motion, and the 
motion for judgment mentioned in subdivision (c) of this rule shall be heard 
and determined before trial on application of any party, unless the court 
orders that the hearings and determination thereof be deferred until the trial 
(e) Motion for more definite s t a t emen t . If a pleading to which a respon-
sive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a part> cannot 
leasonabl} be required to frame a responsive pleading, he ma\ move for a 
more definite statement before interposing his responsive pleading The mo-
tion shall point out the defects complained of and the details desired If the 
motion is granted and the order of the court is not obeyed within ten days 
after notice of the order or within such other time as the court may fix, the 
court may strike the pleading to which the motion was directed or make such 
order as it deems just 
(f) Motion to s t r ike . Upon motion made by a party before responding to a 
pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, upon motion 
made by a party within twenty days after the service of the pleading upon 
him, the court may order stricken from any pleading any insufficient defense 
or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous mat ter . 
(g) Consolidation of defenses. A party who makes a motion under this 
rule may join with it the other motions herein provided for and then available 
to him. If a party makes a motion under this rule and does not include therein 
all defenses and objections then available to him which this rule permits to be 
raised by motion, he shall not thereafter make a motion based on any of the 
defenses or objections so omitted, except as provided in subdivision (h) of this 
rule. 
(h) Waiver of defenses . A party waives all defenses and objections which 
he does not present either by motion as hereinbefore provided or, if he has 
made no motion, in his answer or reply, except (1) that the defense of failure 
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the defense of failure to join 
an indispensable party, and the objection of failure to state a legal defense to a 
claim may also be made by a later pleading, if one is permitted, or by motion 
for judgment on the pleadings or a t the tr ial on the merits, and except (2) that, 
whenever it appears by suggestion of the parties or otherwise tha t the court 
lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action. The 
objection or defense, if made at the trial, shall be disposed of as provided in 
Rule 15(b) in the light of any evidence that may have been received. 
(i) Pleading after denial of a motion. The filing of a responsive pleading 
after the denial of any motion made pursuant to these rules shall not be 
deemed a waiver of such motion. 
(j) Security for costs of a nonresident plaintiff. When the plaintiff in an 
action resides out of this state, or is a foreign corporation, the defendant may 
file a motion to require the plaintiff to furnish security for costs and charges 
which may be awarded against such plaintiff. Upon hearing and determina-
tion by the court of the reasonable necessity therefor, the court shall order the 
plaintiff to file a $300.00 undertaking with sufficient sureties as security for 
payment of such costs and charges as may be awarded against such plaintiff. 
No security shall be required of any officer, instrumentality, or agency of the 
United States. 
(k) Effect of failure to file undertaking. If the plaintiff fails to file the 
undertaking as ordered within 30 days of the service of the order, the court 
shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter an order dismissing the action. 
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; April 1, 1990.) 
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amend-
ment inserted "and complaint" in the first sen-
tence. 
ANALYSIS 
Jurisdiction over the person. 
Motion for judgment on pleadings. 
—Matters outside of pleadings. 
Answers to interrogatories. 
Rights of opposing party. 
Motion for more definite statement. 
—Bill of particulars. 
—Criteria. 
—Motion to dismiss distinguished. 
—Purpose. 
Delay. 
Obtaining evidence. 
Motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 
—Explained. 
—Improper. 
—Standard of review. 
Presentation of defenses. 
—How presented. 
Affirmative defenses. 
Compiler's Notes. — Except for minor vari-
ations, this rule follows Rule 12, F.R.C.P. 
Cross-References. — Motions generally, 
Rule 7. 
Divorce. 
Election of remedies. 
Failure to state claim upon which relief 
can be granted. 
General and special appearances. 
Statute of frauds. 
Venue. 
—When presented. 
Amended answer. 
Security for costs of nonresident plaintiff. 
—Failure to file. 
Summary judgment. 
—Conversion of motion to dismiss. 
—Court's discretion. 
—Court's initiative. 
—Defenses. 
—Opportunity to present pertinent material. 
—Preclusion. 
Issues of fact. 
Waiver of defenses. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
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Exhibit D: Rule 65B, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 
IVIL PROCEDURE Rule 65B 
(4) in all other cases where an injunction 
would be proper in equity. 
Rule 65B. E x t r a o r d i n a r y wr i t s . 
(a) Special forms of wr i t s abo l i shed . Special 
forms of pleadings and of writs in habeas corpus, 
mandamus, quo warranto, certiorari, prohibition, and 
other extraordinary writs, as heretofore known, are 
hereby abolished. Where no other plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy exists, relief may be obtained by 
appropriate action under these rules, on any one of 
the grounds set forth in Subdivisions (b) and (f) of this 
rule. 
(b) G r o u n d s for relief. Appropriate relief may be 
granted: 
(1) where any person usurps, intrudes into, or 
unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, civil 
or military, or a franchise, or an office in a corpo-
ration created by the authority of this s tate; or 
any public officer, civil or military, does or per-
mits to be done any act which by the provisions of 
law works a forfeiture of his office; or an associa-
tion of persons act as a corporation within this 
state without being legally incorporated; or any 
corporation has offended against any provision of 
the law, as it may have been amended, by or 
under which law such corporation was created, 
altered or renewed; or any corporation has for-
feited its privileges and franchises by nonuser or 
has committed an act amounting to a surrender 
or a forfeiture of its corporate rights, privileges 
and franchises or has misused a franchise or 
privilege conferred upon it by law, or exercised a 
franchise or privilege not so conferred; or 
(2) where an inferior tribunal, board or officer 
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its ju-
risdiction or abused its discretion; or 
(3) where the relief sought is to compel any 
inferior tribunal, or any corporation, board or 
person to perform an act which the law specially 
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, t rus t or 
station; or to compel the admission of a par ty to 
the use and enjoyment of a r ight or office to 
which he is entitled and from which he is unlaw-
fully excluded by such inferior tr ibunal or by 
such corporation, board or person; or 
(4) where the relief sought is to arrest the pro-
ceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board or 
person, whether exercising functions judicial or 
ministerial, when such proceedings are without 
or in excess of the jurisdiction of such tr ibunal , 
corporation, board or person. 
(c) Action by a t t o rney gene ra l u n d e r Subd iv i -
sion (b)(1) of this ru le . The attorney general may, 
and when directed so to do by the governor shall, 
commence any action authorized by the provisions of 
Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule. Such action shall be 
brought in the name of the state of Utah. 
(d) Action by p r iva te p e r s o n u n d e r Subd iv i -
s ion (b)(1) of this ru le . A person claiming to be enti-
tled to a public or private office unlawfully held and 
exercised by another may bring an action therefor. A 
private person may bring an action upon any other 
ground set forth in Subdivision (b)(1) of this rule, only 
if the attorney general fails to do so after notice. Any 
such action commenced by a private person shall be 
brought in his own name. Upon filing the complaint, 
such person shall also file an undertaking with suffi-
cient sureties, in the same form required of bonds on 
appeal under the provision of Rule 73 and conditioned 
that such person will pay any judgment for costs or 
damages recovered against him in such action. 
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(e) N a t u r e a n d extent of relief u n d e r Subdivi-
sion (b)(2) of this rule . Upon the filing of a com-
plaint seeking relief under Subdivision (b)(2) of this 
rule, the court may require notice to be given to the 
adverse party before issuance of the writ, or may 
grant an order to show cause why such writ should 
not be issued, or may grant the writ without notice. If 
the writ is granted, it shall be directed to the inferior 
tribunal, board, or officer, or to any other person hav-
ing the custody of the record or proceedings, com-
manding such tribunal, board or officer to certify 
fully to the court issuing the writ, within a specified 
time, a transcript of the record and proceedings, de-
scribing or referring to them with sufficient cer-
tainty; and if a stay of proceedings is intended, re-
quiring the party in the meantime to desist from fur-
ther proceedings in the matter to be reviewed. The 
review by the court issuing the writ shall not be ex-
tended further than to determine whether the infe-
rior tribunal, board or officer has regularly pursued 
the authority of such tribunal, board or officer. 
(f) Habeas corpus. Appropriate relief by habeas 
corpus proceedings shall be granted whenever it ap-
pears to the proper court that any person is unjustly 
imprisoned or otherwise restrained of his liberty. If 
the person seeking relief is imprisoned in the peni-
tentiary and asserts that in the proceedings which 
resulted in his conviction there was a substantial de-
nial of his rights under the Constitution of the United 
States or under the Constitution of the state of Utah, 
or both, then the person seeking such relief shall pro-
ceed in accordance with Rule 65B(i). In all other 
cases, proceedings under this subdivision shall be 
conducted in accordance with the following provi-
sions: 
(1) The complaint seeking relief shall, among 
other things, state that the person designated is 
illegally restrained of his liberty by the defen-
dant and the place where he is so restrained, if 
known (stating wherein and the cause or pre-
tense thereof, according to the best information 
of the plaintiff, annexing a copy of any legal pro-
cess or giving a satisfactory explanation for fail-
ing so to do); that the legality of the imprison-
ment or restraint has not already been adjudged 
upon a prior proceeding; whether another com-
plaint for the same relief has been filed and relief 
thereunder denied by any court, and if so attach-
ing a copy of such complaint and stating the rea-
sons for the denial of relief or giving satisfactory 
reasons for the failure to do so. 
(2) The complaint shall be filed in the court 
most convenient to the plaintiff. 
(3) Upon the filing of the complaint the court 
shall, unless it appears from such complaint or 
the showing of the plaintiff that he is not entitled 
to any relief, issue a writ directed to the defen-
dant commanding him to bring the person al-
leged to be restrained before the court at a time 
and place therein specified, at which time the 
court shall proceed in a summary manner to hear 
the matter and render judgment accordingly. If 
the writ is not issued the court shall state its 
reasons therefor in writing and file the same 
with the complaint, and shall deliver a copy 
thereof to the plaintiff. 
(4) If the defendant cannot be found, or if he 
does not have such person in custody, the writ 
(and any other process issued) may be served 
upon any one having such person in custody, in 
the manner and with the same effect as if he had 
been made defendant in the action. 
(5) If the defendant conceals himself, or re-
fuses admittance to the person a t tempting to 
serve the writ, or if he at tempts wrongfully to 
carry the person imprisoned or restrained out of 
the county or state after service of the writ, the 
person serving the writ shall immediately arrest 
the defendant, or other person so resisting, and 
bring him, together with the person designated 
in the writ, forthwith before the court before 
which the writ is made returnable. 
(6) At the time of the issuance of the writ, the 
court may, if it appears tha t the person desig-
nated will be carried out of the jurisdiction of the 
court or will suffer some irreparable injury before 
compliance with the writ can be enforced, cause a 
warrant to issue, reciting the facts, and directing 
the sheriff to take such person and forthwith 
bring him before the court to be dealt with ac-
cording to law. 
(7) The defendant shall appear a t the proper 
time and place with the person designated or 
show good cause for not doing so and must an-
swer the complaint within the t ime allowed. The 
answer must state plainly and unequivocally 
whether he then has, or at any t ime has had, the 
person designated under his control and re-
straint, and if so, the cause thereof. If such per-
son has been transferred, the defendant must 
state that fact, and to whom, when the transfer 
was made, and the reason or authori ty therefor. 
The writ shall not be disobeyed for any defect of 
form or misdescription of the person restrained or 
defendant, if enough is stated to show the mean-
ing and intent thereof. 
(8) The person restrained may waive his right 
to be present at the hearing, in which case the 
writ shall be modified accordingly. Pending a de-
termination of the mat ter the court may place 
such person in the custody of such individual or 
individuals as may be deemed proper. 
(g) When counsel appointed for petitioner. Any 
person filing a petition for habeas corpus may be ap-
pointed counsel whenever the district court, upon ex-
amination of the petition, determines tha t the peti-
tion is not frivolous and tha t such person is finan-
cially unable to obtain representation. If the petition 
for habeas corpus is frivolous, the district court shall, 
without further action, dismiss the petition 
(h) When wr i t r e t u r n a b l e . Any al ternat ive writ 
issued by a court or a judge thereof, may be made 
returnable, and a hearing thereon may be had, at any 
time as such court may in its discretion determine. 
(i) Pos tconv ic t ion h e a r i n g s . 
(1) Any person imprisoned in the penitentiary 
or county jail under a commitment of any court, 
whether such imprisonment be under an original 
commitment or under a commitment for viola-
tion of probation or parole, who asserts that in 
any proceedings which resulted in his commit-
ment there was a substantial denial of his rights 
under the Constitution of the United States or of 
the state of Utah, or both, may insti tute a pro-
ceeding under this rule. 
Such proceedings shall be commenced by filing 
a complaint, together with a copy thereof, with 
the clerk of the court in which such relief lS 
sought. The complainant shall also serve a copy 
of the complaint so filed upon the attorney gen" 
eral of the state of Utah if imprisoned in the state 
prison, or the county attorney of the county 
where imprisoned if in a county jail Such service 
may be made by an\ of the methods provided fcr 
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service in Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, or by mailing such copy to the attorney 
general or county attorney by United States 
mail, postage prepaid, and by filing with the 
clerk of said court a certificate of mailing certify-
ing under oath that a copy was so mailed to the 
attorney general or county attorney. Upon the 
filing of such a complaint, the clerk shall 
promptly bring the same to the attention of the 
presiding judge of the court in which such com-
plaint is filed. 
(2) The complaint shall state that the person 
seeking relief is illegally restrained of his liberty 
by the defendant; shall state the place where he 
is so restrained; shall state the dates of and iden-
tify the proceedings in which the complainant 
was convicted and by which he was subsequently 
confined and of which he now complains; and 
shall set forth in plain and concise terms the fac-
tual data constituting each and every manner in 
which the complainant claims that any constitu-
tional rights were violated. The complaint shall 
have attached thereto affidavits, copies of 
records, or other evidence supporting such alle-
gations, or shall state why the same are not at-
tached. 
The complaint shall also state whether or not 
the judgment of conviction that resulted in the 
confinement complained of has been reviewed on 
appeal, and if so, shall identify such appellate 
proceedings and state the results thereof. 
The complaint shall further state that the le-
gality or constitutionality of his commitment or 
confinement has not already been adjudged in a 
prior habeas corpus or other similar proceeding; 
and if the complainant shall have instituted prior 
similar proceedings in any court, state or federal, 
within the state of Utah, he shall so state in his 
complaint, shall attach a copy of any pleading 
filed in such court by him to his complaint, and 
shall set forth the reasons for the denial of relief 
in such other court. In such case, if it is apparent 
to the court in which the proceeding under this 
rule is instituted that the legality or constitu-
tionality of his confinement has already been ad-
judged in such prior proceedings, the court shall 
forthwith dismiss such complaint, giving written 
notice thereof by mail to the complainant, and no 
further proceedings shall be had on such com-
plaint. 
(3) Argument, citations and discussion of au-
thorities shall not be set forth in the complaint, 
but may be set out in a separate supporting mem-
orandum or brief if the complainant so desires. 
(4) All claims of the denial of any of complain-
ant's constitutional rights shall be raised in the 
postconviction proceeding brought under this 
rule and may not be raised in another subse-
quent proceeding except for good cause shown 
therein. 
(5) [Deleted.] 
(6) Within ten days after service of a copy of 
the complaint upon him, the attorney general, or 
the county attorney, as the case may be, shall 
answer the complaint or otherwise plead thereto. 
Any further pleadings or amendments shall be in 
conformity with the Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. 
(7) When an answer is filed, the court shall 
immediately set the case for a hearing within 
twenty days thereafter unless the court in its dis-
cretion determines that further time is needed 
Prior to the hearing, the state or county shall 
obtain such transcript of proceedings or court 
records as may be relevant and material to the 
case. The court, on its own motion, or upon the 
request of either party, may order a prehearing 
conference if good reason exists therefor; but 
such conference shall not be set so as to unrea-
sonably delay the hearing on the merits of the 
complaint. The complainant shall be brought be-
fore the court for any hearing or conference. 
If the court in which the complaint is filed de-
termines that in the interest of convenience and 
economy, the hearing should be transferred to 
the district court having jurisdiction over the 
place of confinement of complainant, the court 
may enter a written order transferring such case 
and shall set forth in such order its reasons for so 
doing. 
(8) In each case, the court, upon determining 
the case, shall enter specific findings of fact and 
conclusions of law and judgment, in writing, and 
the same shall be made a part of the record in the 
case. 
If the court finds in favor of the complainant, it 
shall enter an appropriate order with respect to 
the judgment or sentence in the former proceed-
ings and such further orders with respect to 
rearraignment, retrial, custody, bail or discharge 
as the court may deem just and proper in the 
case. 
(9) If the complainant is unable to pay the 
costs of the proceedings, he may proceed in forma 
pauperis upon the filing of an affidavit to that 
effect, in which event the court may direct the 
costs to be paid by the county in which he was 
originally charged. 
(10) Any final judgment entered upon such 
complaint may be appealed to and reviewed by 
the Supreme Court of Utah as an appeal in civil 
cases. 
(Amended effective Jan. 1, 1985; March 1, 1988.) 
Exhibit E: West Valley City Civil Service 
Policy and Procedures Manual: 
Rule 11-32 
Rule III-l 
Rule III-2 
Rule III-6 
Rule III-7 
-Tr-3^ Lay-Off lAsts. 
Any employee l^ci off because of force reductions, abolition of 
position, or other reasofis^TOt the fault of the enployee, may be restored to 
the top of the applicable eliglblej.ist. 
11-31. Probationary Period, 
The probationary or working test period shall be regarded as an integral 
part of the examination process and shall be utilized for training and for 
closely observing the enployee's work and ability, securing the most effective 
adjustmsnt of a new or promoted enployee, and for rejecting any enployee whose 
performance does not meet the required work standards. 
11-32. Duration. 
(1) All sworn police officers and firefighters certified and appointed 
or promoted to a Civil Service position shall be required to suc-
cessfully complete a work and training test during a probationary 
period of one year to enable the appointing power to observe the 
enployee's ability to perform the various duties pertaining to the 
position, 
(2) All Civil Service employees shall serve a one-year probation,. The 
woxk and training test shall begin irrmediately upon appointment and 
shall continue for a period of time appropriate to the duties of the 
position involved. 
(3) If the department requests an extension of the established proba-
tionary period before the expiration thereof , the Commission may 
approve the extension of the probationary period or may take such 
action on its own initiative. 
11-33. Dismissal. 
At any time during the probationary period, the Chief, after consultation 
with the Personnel Officer and City Attorney's Office, may remove a 
probationary enployee from employment without cause or ray return a prior 
Civil Service enployee to a previous position without cause. Removal of such 
enployee shall be effective upon written notification from the Chief, and is 
not subject to appeal. 
11-34. Ijeave During Probationary PasriLod. 
Time spent on any leave of absence without pay shall not be considered 
as part of any probationary period. 
11-35. Probationary Period Reports. 
At least ten (10) days prior to the expiration of an employee's 
probationary period, the Chief shall notify the Personnel Department and the 
Comuission in writing whether the services of the enployee have been 
-13-
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11-44. Qmnge of Address. 
All Civil Service employees, probationary or otherwise, must advise the 
Personnel Officer of any change of residence or address within ten days 
following such changes. 
III. 
PROMOTIONS 
-£11-1* Basis and Classification. 
The Commission shall provide for promotion in the Civil Service on the 
basis of ascertained merit, seniority in service and standing obtained by 
competitive examination, and shall provide, in all cases where practicable, 
that vacancies shall be filled by promotion from the members of the next lower 
rank as submit themselves for the examination and promotion. The Commission 
shall certify to the Chief from an eligibles list the names of not more than 
5 applicants having the highest rating for each promotion. 
III-2. Types of Pramotians, 
Promotions shall be designated as promotions in grade or promotions in 
rank. Promotions in grade shall be those promotions made in recognition of 
superior skills in the performance of duties achieved through experience and 
proficiency, but which do not involve a substantial change in duties. 
Promotions in rank shall be those promotions which result in a substantial 
change in assigned duties, requiring supervisory and administrative skills or 
substantially different training skills. 
III-2* Physical Examination Requirements far All Pranacitians. 
All applicants for promotion must have passed a physical examination 
prescribed by the Commission within one year prior to the date such promotion 
is made. Such physical examination shall determine that the applicant has no 
non-correctable physical disorders or handicaps which wsuld disqualify the 
applicant for the position sought, or which would interfere with the 
applicant's maximum performance in the position being sought. If it is 
determined that the applicant has some correctable physical disorder or 
handicap which disqualifies the applicant from promotion or would prevent the 
applicant from giving the maximum performance in the position being sought, 
the commission may refuse to certify such applicant as being eligible for 
promotion until such disorder or handicap is corrected or the Commission may 
waive the requirement. 
III-3. Failure on Hiysical or Mental Examinations far Promotion. 
Whenever a Civil Service employee fails to pass a physical or mental 
examination by a physician, the examining physician shall make a report to the 
Commission setting forth the following infonration: 
-16-
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III-5. Relative Weights of Various Hhases. 
A- lasting weight is not to exceed 60% for any of the following categories: 
(1) Performance Ratings; The performance ratings (merit) of the 
respective departments dealing with leadership and administrative 
abilities for the immediate past years required for promotion 
candidacy. 
(2) Written Examination. 
(3) Oral Assessment: Applicants may be involved with an assessment 
board to determine their self-confidence, bearing, personality 
traits, leadership qualities, supervisory abilities, determination 
of intelligence, aptitudes and abilities in dealing with problem 
situations. 
(4) Promotability: An assessment of the candidate's ability to perform 
in the desired position by a board of higher-ranking officers. 
Weights shall be approved prior to examination by Civil Service. 
lii-te. Jb^ ramotions in Grade. 
Promotions in grade are designed to provide persons in Civil Service with 
the opportunity to obtain progressive salary increases based upon a 
combination of longevity in service, physical fitness, and proficiency in 
perfornance of duties as ascertained by the Commission from the periodic merit 
ratings, written and oral examinations, and other required data. All in-grade 
advancements are to be handled in a uniform nanner. M l merit pay increases 
shall be handled in accordance with the guidelines set forth in the West 
Valley City Personnel Policy and Procedures Manual. 
Whenever a member of the Civil Service shall have the necessary require-
ments for a promotion in grade and shall have passed such examination as 
provided in these rules, or as prescribed by the CCmmission, if any, the 
Personnel Officer shall certify to the Chief that such person is eligible for 
promotion in grade. Upon certification, the Chief nay, at any time 
thereafter, promote such persai to the grade for which he is certified. The 
City Manager nay approve or disapprove any merit increase or in-grade 
promotion for good cause. Whenever the Chief, with the City Manager's 
approval, shall nake the promotion in grade, notice of the action and the date 
on which such promotion is effective is to be given to the Camiission. 
III-7. Prnmrrtions in Rank. 
Promotions in rank shall be those promotions which result in a sub-
stantial change in assigned duties, requiring supervisory and administrative 
skills or substantially different training skills. 
-18-
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Exhibit F: West Valley Police Department 
Manual, Section 1700.23 
Chapter 
(2/87) 
Kegs, 
6 
1/00.21 Cont' 
1700.22 
Rank is a designation of a specific level of responsi-
bility for execution of work, supervision, command, 
management, or administration specifically distin-
guished from other levels by class specifications and 
name. 
Rank Order 
Rank order is the vertical relationship of the several 
ranks of this department in respect to levels of 
authority and responsibility. 
E700. 23f Rank Structure; 
Rank structure is the hierarchial arrangement of ranks 
within the department. The ranks of this department 
are listed below in descending order: 
Police Chief 
Lieutenant 
Sergeant 
Police Officer 
1700.24 
1700.25 
Services Line 
Line services are functions and activities which are 
basically concerned with fulfilling primary police 
responsibilities. 
Services, Staff 
1700.26 
Staff services are non-line functions and ac t iv i t i e s 
which serve the purposes of developing personnel into 
e f fec t ive p a t r o l o f f i ce r s , superv i sors , commanding 
o f f i c e r s , admin i s t ra to r s , and of developing t h i s 
department to most effectively meet i t s responsibil-
i t i e s in fu l f i l l ing the police purposes or missions. 
Watch 
A watch designates one of the three basic time units 
for assignment of personnel, usually specified in 
terms of eight or ten hour periods. 
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Exhibit G: Affidavits of Cory Ervin (2) 
. •• JRT 
/ '-' -. 'M'"! 
PAUL T. MORRIS, #37 38 
City Attorney 
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
Telephone: (801)966-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER 
OF POLICE LODGE #4, 
a nonprofit Utah corporation, 
AND JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs, 
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
City Chief of Police, AND WEST 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CORY ERVIN 
Civil No. 89-0907667 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, CORY ERVIN, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and say as 
follows: 
1. I have worked for West Valley City since September, 1984. 
UU184 
2. My current position with West Valley City is Personnel 
Generalist in the Administration Department. 
3. Since January, 1986, I have served as Secretary to the 
West Valley City Civil Service Commission, The duties of that 
position include being the custodian of all records of the West 
Valley City Civil Service Commission. 
4. The Civil Service Commission records in my possession 
indicate the following: 
a. The written examination for promotion to sergeant 
in the West Valley City Police Department was given 
on Thursday, July 20, 1989. 
b. The minimum passing score on the written examination 
was a score of 75. 
c. Officer Jim Crowley applied and took the written 
examination. 
d. Officer Crowley did not receive a score of 75 or 
above the written examination, and therefore, did 
not advance to the assessment center portion of the 
testing. 
e. Officer Crowley, because of his below passing score 
on the written test, is not listed on the 
promotional roster which resulted from the 1989 
sergeants' examination. 
5. As custodian of the records and Secretary to the 
Commission, I have no record, nor do I have any knowledge, of the 
Commission receiving any request, appeal, or other communication 
2 
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from the organization known as "West Valley City Fraternal Order of 
Police Lodge #4" regarding the 1989 sergeants' examination, except 
in connection with the above-encaptioned lawsuit. 
6• As custodian of the records and - Secretary to the 
Commission, I have no record, nor do I have any knowledge of the 
Commission sending any information, ruling, or other communication 
regarding the 1989 sergeants' examination, except information 
supplied in connection with the above-encaptioned lawsuit. 
7. The records of the Civil Service Commission also reflect 
that Charles Illsley and Guy Dodge were promoted to sergeant as a 
result of the 1989 sergeants' examination. Also, Craig Gibson is 
currently listed as Number One on the sergeants' promotional 
roster. 
8. As Personnel Generalist for West Valley City, one of my 
job duties is to track employee payroll deductions and to enter and 
delete such deductions from the payroll system. 
9. As of the payroll period ending February 8, 1991, Dennis 
Nordfelt, Guy Dodge, Charles Illsley, Craig Gibson, Stephen 
Shreeve, and Larry Moody have all authorized and are paying dues to 
the West Valley City Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4 by payroll 
deduction. 
DATED this \C\ day of February, 1991. 
t AY[AA 
CORYEHVIN 
£ui I.XAA > 
U018Q 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
February, 1991. 
/9 <**- day of 
^yC^t^c^t^- ~7°-
NOTARY PUBLIC 
'7&sMs4>&^£^(-4--~ 
Residing at: ~^6*i- ~?LA^L£^ CJ-U^V6<_^^ 
My Commission Expires: 
A9 /99V-Q^*^< KAREN P HINCKLEY Notary Public 
STATE OF UTAH 
My Commission Expires 
June 29,1994 
3600 Consttrtor,. Watf Vrfty Oy 'JT M119 
JRC:KH:ERVIN.AFF 
021591:F:PERS89-21 
uul87 
PAUL T. MORRIS, #3738 
City Attorney 
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
Telephone: (801)966-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER 
OF POLICE LODGE #4, 
a nonprofit Utah corporation, 
AND JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
City Chief of Police, AND WEST 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CORY ERVIN 
Civil No. 89-0907667 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, CORY ERVIN, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and say as 
follows: 
1. I have worked for West Valley City since September, 1984. 
2. My current position with West Valley City is Personnel 
Generalist in the Administration Department. 
uf}281 
3. Since January, 1986, I have served as Secretary to the 
West Valley City Civil Service Commission. The duties of that 
position include being the custodian of all Commission records, 
preparing minutes of all Commission meetings and providing the 
necessary clerical support to Commission members, 
4. As Personnel Generalist, my duties include the 
coordination and administration of promotional examinations and 
entry level examinations for City employees. 
5. As Civil Service Secretary, I have been present on 
numerous occasions when the Civil Service Commission discussed and 
approved testing criteria for various promotional tests, including 
the 1989 Sergeants' Promotional Examination• 
6 • It has been my experience and personal observation as 
Civil Service Secretary that prior to each promotional examination 
the Civil Service Commission approves various testing criteria, 
including those eligible for promotion, the testing topics and 
questions, the use of assessment centers and the weights given to 
the various elements of the testing and evaluation process• 
7. Based upon my participation in the 1989 Sergeant 
promotion process, which included screening applications to ensure 
the applicants met the minimum requirements, I have personal 
knowledge that every police officer who tested for Sergeant was 
required to be off probation in order to be eligible to test. 
8. Based on my experience as Civil Service Secretary and 
Personnel Generalist, I have personal knowledge that police 
officers are required to have at least one year of service with the 
2 
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West Valley City Police Department prior to being removed from 
probation, 
9. Based upon my experience as Civil Service Secretary and 
Personnel Generalist, I have personal knowledge that Police Officer 
is the rank immediately below Sergeant in the West Valley City 
Police Department. 
10. Based on my experience as Civil Service Secretary and 
Personnel Generalist, I have personal knowledge that the rank of 
Police Officer in the West Valley City Police Department is divided 
into grades known as Police Officer I, Police Officer II and Police 
Officer III. 
11. The Civil Service Commission records in my possession 
indicate that Officer Jim Crowley holds the rank and grade of 
Police Officer II. 
DATED this )uf day of August, 1991. 
T (AAJ, 
Y ERflTN 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /*/- <&d— day of 
August, 1991. 
NOTARY PUBLIC s j " >, 0 
Residing at: 3^-<^ 7G^/fe^ L^hUsKt^f-^^ 
My Commission Expires: 
^yC4^^ 
JRC:KH:ERVIN2.AFF 
081491:F:PERS89-21(a) 
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Exhibit H: Affidavit of J. Stephen Shreeve 
:UURT 
PAUL T. MORRIS, #3738 
City Attorney 
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
Telephone: (801)966-3600 
TH 
S.'. 
BY 
-r'iCT 
h l Y 
DEPUTY CLERK 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER 
OF POLICE LODGE #4, 
a nonprofit Utah corporation, 
AND JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
City Chief of Police, AND WEST 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF J. STEPHEN SHREEVE 
Civil No. 89-0907667 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, J. SHEPHEN SHREEVE, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and 
say as follows: 
1. I am currently employed as a police officer by West 
Valley City, and have been so employed since July 1, 1980. 
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2. My current position with West Valley City is Assistant 
Police Chief, and I have held that position since 1987. 
3. As part of my duties as Assistant Chief, I participated 
in formulating and administering the 1989 testing for promotion to 
the position of Sergeant within the West Valley City Police 
Department. 
4. On August 16, 1990, I was deposed by the Plaintiffs in 
the above-entitled action with regard to my actions during the 
formulation and conduct of the 1989 sergeants promotional process, 
including the written test and materials, and the assessment 
center. 
5. I am a dues-paying member of the West Valley Fraternal 
Order of Police Lodge #4 (hereinafter FOP), and have been such 
since the Lodge was formed. 
6. Immediately prior to my deposition on August 16, 1990, I 
requested that the FOP provide me with legal counsel at the 
deposition in order to protect my interests. 
7. The FOP refused to provide me with legal counsel at my 
deposition because of a conflict of interest. 
8. I made a statement, on the record, regarding my request 
for counsel and the conflict of interest at the commencement of my 
deposition. 
DATED this /f"7^ day of February, 1991. 
J/ STEPHEN SHREEVE ¥ 
,.1)189 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
February, 1991. 
/9 £A-
 day of 
My Commission Expires: 
^ 9 /9f^ 
$ " • 
NOTARY PUBLIC " ~ / 
R e s i d i n g a t : S^Ot. ~&^AUL~ Ur-t^f^t^^^ 
<(&*$&. /& KAREN P HINCKLEY Notary Public 
| STATE OF UTAH 
' My Commission Expires 
June 29. 1°94 
JSOOConnMon Wes! Val :>> O-y !JT 84119 
JRC:KH:SHREEVE.AFF 
021591:F:PERS89-21 
UU190 
Exhibit I: Affidavit of Larry L. Moody 
COURT 
FEB h S ic At; ^'j 
PAUL T. MORRIS, #3738 
City Attorney 
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
Telephone: (801)966-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER 
OF POLICE LODGE #4, 
a nonprofit Utah corporation, 
AND JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
City Chief of Police, AND WEST 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LARRY L. MOODY 
Civil No. 89-0907667 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, LARRY L. MOODY, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and say 
as follows: 
1. I am currently employed as a police officer by West 
Valley City, and have been so employed since October 20, 1980. 
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2. My current position with West Valley City is Lieutenant, 
and I have held that rank since 1987. 
3. As part of my duties as Lieutenant Chief, I participated 
in formulating and administering the 1989 testing for promotion to 
the position of Sergeant within the West Valley City Police 
Department. 
4. On November 27, 1990, I was deposed by the Plaintiffs in 
the above-entitled action with regard to my actions during the 
formulation and conduct of the 1989 sergeants' promotional process, 
including the written test and materials, the assessment center, 
and the basic promotional standards. 
5. I am a dues-paying member of the West Valley Fraternal 
Order of Police Lodge #4 (hereinafter FOP), and have been such 
since the Lodge was formed. 
6. Immediately prior to my deposition on November 27, 1990, 
I requested that the FOP provide me with legal counsel at the 
deposition in order to protect my interests in this matter. 
7. The FOP refused to provide me with legal counsel at my 
deposition. 
DATED this /^ day of February, 1991. 
^nos^pr1 Mooif 
(/ <U78 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
February, 1991. 
/? **- day of 
My Commission Expires: 
^ ( / i x , ^ 9 /??</• 
NOTARY PUBLIC , ~ ^ 
Residing at: 5^C^ -A^-^UL^ 
'^lyUt^c^A 
C^U^^t^JL^ 
L 
STATE OF UTAH 
^ \ v$S$f / / $ M y Commission Expires 
*~~j *•>* 
June 29,1994 
3600 Ccnstilutlon, West Vafley Cfy. UT 84119 
JRC:KH:MOODY.AFF 
021591:F:PERS89-21 
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Exhibit J: Affidavit of Terry Keefe 
PAUL T. MORRIS, #3738 
City Attorney 
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
Telephone: (801)966-3600 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER 
OF POLICE LODGE #4, 
a nonprofit Utah corporation, 
AND JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
City Chief of Police, AND WEST 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF TERRY KEEFE 
Civil No. 89-0907667 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, TERRY KEEFE, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and say as 
follows: 
1. I have been employed as a Police Officer in the West 
Valley City Police Department since October 20, 1980. 
<i0278 
2. Since October 4, 1987, I have held the rank of Assistant 
Chief in the Department. 
3. At the time of this deposition, Chief Dennis Nordfelt is 
absent from the Department and I am Acting Police Chief of West 
Valley City. 
4. I have personal knowledge that in the West Valley City 
Police Department the rank immediately below Sergeant is the rank 
of Police Officer. 
5. I have personal knowledge that only officers holding the 
rank of Police Officer were promoted to Sergeant following the 1989 
Promotional Examination. 
6. I have personal knowledge that the rank structure in the 
West Valley City Police Department is set forth in the West Valley 
City Police Manual at Section 1700. 23, and that a copy of this rank 
structure is issued to every officer within the Department. 
7. I have personal knowledge that within the rank of Police 
Officer there are three grades consisting of Police Officer I, 
Police Officer II and Police Officer III. 
8. I have personal knowledge that job duties within the rank 
of Police Officer are essentially similar, involve no supervisory 
duties and do not vary based upon an officer's grade designation as 
a P.O. I, P.O. II or P.O. III. 
9. I have personal knowledge that promotions in grade from 
P.O. I to P.O. II within the rank of Police Officer are primarily 
dependant upon the funds available in the Police Department budget 
2 
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and are not determined by a set number of positions within each 
grade• 
DATED thi i.,/? 7^— day of August, 19 91 
T E R R Y K E E F E \ /? 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this /x-^t— ^ay 0f 
August, 1991. 
My Commission Expires: 
<%9 /<?94-V^^ C^ u?, 
"ydisu^k^ v ? ^ ^ c ^ ^ - > 
NOTARY PUBLIC . 
Residing at: ^^t^ TCA_^<L^ L-&U*4L£CA^, 
JRC:KH:KEEFE.AFF 
081491:F:PERS89-21(a) 
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Exhibit K: Affidavit of Dennis J. Nordfelt 
\ J 
,,'»;Ji\ i 
PAUL T. MORRIS, #3738 
City Attorney 
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 9 6 6 - 3 6 0 0 
r"L3 Z J 3 - " ' ^ ' 
THIRtJ • 
561 
DEPUTY C L K S K 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER 
OF POLICE LODGE #4, 
a nonprofit Utah corporation, 
AND JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
City Chief of Police, AND WEST 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DENNIS J. NORDFELT 
Civil No. 89-0907667 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss . 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, DENNIS J. NORDFELT, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and 
say as follows: 
1. I am currently employed by West Valley City as Police 
Chief, and have been so employed since July of 1986. 
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2. I am a Defendant in the above-encaptioned lawsuit. 
3. I am a dues-paying member in good standing of the West 
Valley City Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4, and have been such 
since June of 1987. 
DATED this / fl^A day of February, 1991. 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this / ff /Ez--~ £ay 0f 
February, 1991. 
My Commission Expires: 
^Ky^O^U^K^^ ~F 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing at: jik^t- y£^JuL~. 
1/Ot^^-A ^  
0>c-t*^ru£^A^ 
X S K & N . KAREN P HINCKLEY 
/v£oie£<& Notary Public 
$ STATE OF UTAH 
' ?/ My Commission Expires 
June 29,1994 
3600 CcnstiWion, West Vafley City. l/T 84119 
JRC: KH: NORDFELT. AFF 
021591:F:PERS89-21 
(>U178 
Exhibit L: Affidavit of Craig Gibson 
?0UR1 
PAUL T. MORRIS, #3738 
City Attorney 
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
Telephone: (801)966-3600 
OEP'vTY JlCRX 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER 
OF POLICE LODGE #4, 
a nonprofit Utah corporation, 
AND JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
City Chief of Police, AND WEST 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CRAIG GIBSON 
Civil No. 89-0907667 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, CRAIG GIBSON, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and say as 
follows: 
1. I am currently employed as a police officer by West 
Valley City, and have been so employed since June 4, 1984. 
"0182 
2. During the Summer of 1989, I participated in testing for 
promotion to the position of Sergeant within the West Valley City 
Police Department. 
3. As a result of the testing for promotion to Sergeant, I 
am currently Number One on the sergeants' promotion list, and am 
scheduled to be promoted to Sergeant on July 1, 1991. 
4. I am currently a dues-paying member in good standing of 
the West Valley City Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4, and have 
been such since its inception at West Valley City. 
5. If the West Valley City Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 
#4 is granted the relief requested in the above-encaptioned 
lawsuit, I will be denied a promotion in rank and the accompanying 
salary and benefit increase* 
DATED this v>^  fo~ day of February, 1991. 
CRAIG GIBZuk ^ O 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
February, 1991. 
/9 &— day of 
My Commission Expires: 
^yU^yue^ J9 /99V-
NOTARY PUBLIC . * " 
R e s i d i n g a t : <2^LsOt~ ^-4^/LJ^ Ct-u^-du^-
, # • — % KAREN P HiNCMEY 
Ay^^'r&x Notary Public 
STATE OF UTAH \£\ 
v£\ t | Js} My Commission Expires 
v V - J > V June 29,1994 
m
~*-'-?.Vt"*'' 3600 CcntttuHcn. Wes! Vrfley CfN. \JT 84119 
JRC:KH:GIBSON.AFF 
021591:F:PERS89-21 
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Exhibit M: Affidavit of Charles Illsley 
PAUL T. MORRIS, #3738 
City Attorney 
J. RICHARD CATTEN, #4291 
Assistant City Attorney 
Attorneys for Defendants 
West Valley City 
3600 Constitution Boulevard 
West Valley City, UT 84119 
T e l e p h o n e : ( 8 0 1 ) 9 6 6 - 3 6 0 0 
- , } 
TU ' 
C 
BY _ : 
• I .r- Mi « " { 
D F f . • rr,< 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WEST VALLEY FRATERNAL ORDER 
OF POLICE LODGE #4, 
a nonprofit Utah corporation, 
AND JIM CROWLEY, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
DENNIS NORDFELT, West Valley 
City Chief of Police, AND WEST 
VALLEY CIVIL SERVICE 
COMMISSION, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF CHARLES ILLSLEY 
Civil No. 89-0907667 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
I, CHARLES ILLSLEY, being duly sworn, do hereby depose and say 
as follows: 
1. I have been employed as a police officer with the West 
Valley City Police Department since January 19, 1981. 
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2. During the Summer of 1989, I participated in the testing 
process for promotion to Sergeant within the West Valley City 
Police Department. 
3. On September 2, 1989, I was promoted to Sergeant in the 
West Valley City Police Department, 
4. I am a dues-paying member in good standing of the West 
Valley City Fraternal Order of Police Lodge #4, and have been such 
since the Lodge was formed, 
5. If the relief requested by the Fraternal Order of Police 
in the above-encaptioned lawsuit is granted, I will suffer a loss 
of rank from Sergeant to Police Officer III, and may also suffer a 
loss of pay and benefit^. 
DATED this 
ft 
day of February, 19 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 
February, 1991, 
H-ttfo day of 
My Commission E x p i r e s : 
0OAteA^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC ^  , 
Residing at: Z^XJjA 
BARBARA HOLTRY 
Notary Pubic 
STATE OF UTAH 
My CommMon Expires 
November 2 1 . 1992 
WOO ConrtUcn EM. WVC. UT14111 
iMuk 
JRC:KH:ILLSLEY.AFF 
021591:F:PERS89-21 
0UI8I 
Exhibit N: June 6, 1989, Promotion Announcement 
Memorandum 
PLAINTIFF'S 
_ _ EXHIBIT 
\ A / A / 7 West Valley City WW POLICE DEPARTMENT 
v ^ £ — ) 
June 6, 1989 
MEMORANDUM 
TO: All Police Officers Eligible for Promotional 
Examination - Sergeant 
FROM: Chief's Offi<dCj 
RE: Promotional Examination 
^i i^y^^^— 
T h i s memorandum i s to n o t i f y o f f i c e r s t h a t t h e r e w i l l be a 
promotional examination for an immediate Sergeant ' s pos i t ion and 
to e s t a b l i s h a r o s t e r . Passing grade for a l l t e s t s wi l l be se t a t 
75%. 
A l l q u a l i f i e d and i n t e r e s t e d c a n d i d a t e s need t o apply by 
submit t ing a to/from to Ass is tan t Chief Shreeve ind ica t ing t h e i r 
i n t e r e s t and o u t l i n i n g q u a l i f i c a t i o n s no l a t e r than &xft&o&$c 
^m4$i^4mu^^m^7M^Kiami^ NOON, ON MONDAY, JUNE 19, 1989. 
QUALIFICATIONS : 
Must have four years of police service (plus two additional 
years police experience if substituting for college). 
- Must have two years of college (two years police experience 
can be substituted). 
Must be off probation. 
- Must have above averaoe performance evaluation. 
WRITTEN
 4 EXAMINATION:^ 
AIT qualified 'canfliaares^wiuroe given »vtWO, text DOOKS to 
study from;30 daysi-prior to the, written examination. This 
examination will "consist of management concepts taken from 
this reference material, and will be the ONLY material 
needed to study for this examination. There will be no 
questions from the criminal code or the policy manual on the 
exam. 
-^ 2470 South Redwood Road West Valley City. Utah 84119 Phone (801) 974-5468 ( / U f l O f t 
Promotional Examination/Sergeant 
June 6, 1989 
Page 2 
Candidates may pick up their text books from Lt. Moody or 
Assistant Chief Shreeve on June 19th and 20th only. 
The written examination will be given on Thursday, July 20, 
1989. 
ASSESSMENT CENTER: 
Only the top 15 candidates (with a passing score) on the 
written examination will be invited to attend a two-day 
assessment center. The assessment center will be July 25th 
and 26th
 # 1989. 
Times and places for both the written examination and assessment 
center will be announced later. 
(»0007 
Exhibit 0: 13 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal 
Practice and Procedure: 
Jurisdiction 2d § 3531.9, pp. 617-23 
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the organization as representative is superior to an individual ac-
tion. 
Inquiry into the purpose of the organization also suggests 
that some inquiry be made into the nature of the organization. 
Some forms of organization may be more appropriate for repre-
sentation than others. The cases, however, reflect little concern 
with this possibility. Most cases involve representation by envi-
ronmental, neighborhood, political action, or trade organizations 
in traditional forms. The Hunt case involved a variation that 
does not provide any general lessons. The Apple Commission 
was a state agency, not a private association of the state grow-
ers and dealers. Examining the composition and activities of the 
Commission, however, the Court concluded that it was indistin-
guishable from "a traditional trade association representing the 
individual growers and dealers who collectively form its constit-
uency/' 140 The general lack of attention to such matters may 
reflect the fact that there are few problems. Nonetheless, it is 
prudent to hold open the prospect that some forms of association 
may not warrant the assumption of adequate representation that 
is made for the more familiar forms. The greatest care should 
be taken with associations whose members have little choice 
whether to be members and have divergent interests. Like care 
should be taken with organizations that ordinarily would not be 
expected to undertake litigation on behalf of fheir constituents. 
An ordinary commercial corporation, for example, generally 
should not be permitted to borrow standing from injured stock-
holders. 
The third prong of the test asks whether individual participa-
tion is required by the nature of the underlying claim or the re-
lief sought.141 The most compelling need for individual partici-
pation is likely to occur when there are conflicts of interest, or 
140. Commission as association 
97 S.Ct. at 2442, 432 U.S. at 345. 
The Commission was composed of 13 
apple growers and dealers. Apple 
growers and dealers financed the 
Commission by compulsory assess-
ments, elected its members, and 
were alone eligible to become mem-
bers. The Commission promoted 
the sale of Washington apples 
through advertising, market re-
search and analysis, and public edu-
cation. It engaged in scientific re-
search on uses for apples. 
141. Individual participation 
An association may be an appropriate 
representative of its members "so 
long as the nature of the claim and 
of the relief sought does not make 
the individual participation of each 
injured party indispensable to prop-
er resolution of the cause 
* * V Warth v. Seldin, 1975, 95 
S.Ct. 2197, 2212, 422 U.S. 490, 511, 
45 L.Ed.2d 343. 
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at least a divergence of views, between members of the organi-
zation or between the organization and its members. Several 
cases deny organizational standing in such circumstances.142 
142. Conflicting interests 
The Women's Division of the Board of 
Global Ministries of the United 
Methodist Church lacked standing 
to advance a Free Exercise chal-
lenge under the First Amendment 
to the provisions of the Hyde 
Amendment that prohibit Medicaid 
funding of many medically neces-
sary abortions. An organization 
can assert the rights of its members 
only if neither the claim asserted 
nor the relief requested requires the 
participation of individual members. 
The Women's Division had conceded 
that there was a diversity of views 
in its membership concerning the 
matter of abortions, and that the de-
termination of the advisability or 
necessity of an abortion must lie in 
the conscience of the individual be-
fore God. Free exercise claims, 
moreover, require that the coercive 
effect of the enactment be shown as 
it operates against an individual in 
the practice of his religion, so that 
individual participation in the law-
suit must ordinarily be required. 
Harris v. McRae, 1980, 100 S.Ct. 
2671, 2690, 448 U.S. 297, 320-321, 
65 L.Ed.2d 784. 
Although the court did not speak of 
conflicting interests, a good exam-
ple is provided by the ruling that an 
employer who has addressed anti-
union speeches and letters to em-
ployees lacks standing to assert the 
First Amendment rights of the em-
ployees. International Union, Unit-
ed Auto. Workers of America v. 
Dana Corp., C.A.6th, 1982, 679 F.2d 
634, 647. While employer and em-
ployees may have some common in-
terests in sharing the communica-
tions, and employees may encounter 
some difficulty in advancing their 
own interests, the risks of allowing 
the employer to purport to repre-
sent the interests of employees as 
well as its own interests are mani-
fest. 
An association of general contractors 
lacked standing to pursue claims 
that its members were entitled to in-
junctive relief under the antitrust 
laws against an agreement between 
a firm building a major generating 
plant and a number of unions that 
would require any subcontractor to 
negotiate with the unions as exclu-
sive representatives of its employ-
ees. It was uncertain whether any 
individual member would in fact 
have standing. In addition, there 
was no showing that the litigation 
was germane to the organizational 
purposes of the association. Final-
ly, the claim asserted was one that 
required participation of the mem-
bers in the litigation in light of the 
obvious conflict of interests among 
the members. Some members 
might benefit from enforcement of 
the challenged agreement, while 
others might be injured by it. The 
fact that the members had voted 
unanimously to file the action, be-
fore this antitrust theory was 
articulated, did not alter this conclu-
sion. Associated General Con-
tractors v. Otter Tail Power Co., 
C.A 8th, 1979, 611 F.2d 684. 
An organization whose members in-
cluded members of the police de-
partment that was being sued to ob-
tain relief against asserted regular 
use of unconstitutional force by 
members of the department was 
properly dismissed as a plaintiff, be-
cause a clear potential conflict of in-
terest resulted from the possibility 
that its police members might be ad-
versely affected by the decision. 
Calvin v. Conhsk, C.A.7th, 1975, 520 
F.2d 1, 11. Other organizations 
were allowed standing, but after 
the Supreme Court vacated, 1976, 
96 S.Ct. 1093, 424 U.S. 902, 47 L.Ed. 
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Other cases have permitted standing after examination has dis-
pelled the fear of conflict or has persuaded the court that the 
conflict would not injure dissenting members.143 It is possible 
that cases may emerge in which it is practicable to reconcile the 
risk of conflict by permitting organization standing coupled with 
participation by individual members who represent the conflict-
ing interests. It may be wondered, however, whether the con-
cept of organization standing should be carried this far in pref-
erence to individual litigation by the members whose standing 
might be borrowed. 
Individual participation also may seem required because of 
the need for specific fact information to illuminate the basis for 
decision. In such circumstances, it is apt to prove best to deny 
organization standing and to remit the organization to a role in 
support of individual litigation.144 Organization standing is par-
2d 307, standing was denied all 
plaintiffs, C.A.7th, 1976, 534 F.2d 
1251, certiorari denied 96 S.Ct. 1109, 
424 U.S. 912, 47 L.Ed.2d 316. 
143. No injurious conflict 
A union had standing to pursue em-
ployment discrimination claims on 
behalf of its members. There was 
nothing about the claims presented 
that made it necessary that individ-
ual employees be made plaintiffs. 
The counterclaim that had been 
made against the union did not in-
volve any matters that would create 
a conflict of interest between the 
union and its members. The union, 
moreover, could act as a class repre-
sentative despite the technical diffi-
culty that it was not itself a mem-
ber of the class International 
Woodworkers of America v. Chesa-
peake Bay Plywood Corp., C.A.4th, 
1981, 659 F.2d 1259, 1266-1269. 
National Constructors Assn. v. Na-
tional Elec. Contractors Assn., D.C. 
Md.1980, 498 F Supp. 510, judgment 
modified C.A.4th, 678 F.2d 492, de-
scribed in note 133 above. 
An association of contractors had 
standing to challenge a statutory 
requirement that a portion of feder-
al local public works grants be ex-
pended for minority business enter-
prises, even if it be assumed that no 
injury had accrued to its contractor 
member who had secured a specific 
job that had been denied to two oth-
er members who submitted lower 
bids that did not meet the minority 
business enterprise requirement. 
Any conflict of interest among its 
members did not limit its right to 
represent injured members in a suit 
for injunctive and declaratory relief. 
The association would not function 
as a class representative, and need 
not adequately represent the inter-
est of all members. The effect of 
the association suit on its members 
would be no different than the ef-
fect of a like suit brought by any 
single member. Rhode Island 
Chapter, Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors of America v. Kreps, D.C.R.I. 
1978, 450 F.Supp. 338, 346-347 n. 3. 
144. Individual fact need 
See Harris v. McRae, 1980, 100 S.Ct. 
2671, 2690, 448 U.S. 297, 320-321, 
65 L.Ed.2d 784, described in note 
142 above. 
A society dedicated to the separation 
of church and state had standing to 
assert violation of its members' vot-
ing rights by a state constitutional 
requirement that holders of public 
office acknowledge the existence of 
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Some substantive claims may seem inherently so personal 
that individual participation should be required simply because 
of the nature of the claim. A few courts, for example, have sug-
gested that some civil rights claims should be brought directly 
by the person injured, although it is difficult to support any gen-
eral rule to this effect.146 The theory of organization represen-
tation is indeed stretched thin if it is extended to substantially 
146. Civil Rights claims 
In Shaw v. Garrison, C.A.5th, 1977, 
545 F.2d 980, 983 n. 4, reversed on. 
other grounds 1978, 98 S.Ct. 1991, 
436 U.S. 584, 56 L.Ed.2d 554, the 
court noted that the question before 
it was whether an action instituted 
under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 survived 
in favor of the plaintiffs executor 
following the plaintiffs death, and 
that "[t]his is therefore not an at-
tempt to sue under the civil rights 
statutes for deprivation of another's 
constitutional rights. Such suits 
are impermissible. O'Malley v. Bri-
erley, C.A. 3 Cir.1973, 477 F.2d 785; 
Brown v. Board of Trustees of 
LaGrange Indep. School Dist., 5 Cir. 
1951, 187 F.2d 20." (per Wisdom, 
J.). 
Although welfare rights organizations 
could achieve standing on the basis 
of member injury to pursue general 
federal question claims, and could 
assert claims of interference with 
rights of association deriving from 
injury to their members, they could 
not advance general claims arising 
from injury to their members under 
42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. Aguayo v. 
Richardson, C.A.2d, 1973, 473 F.2d 
1090, 1098-1101, certiorari denied 
94 S.Ct. 900, 414 U.S. 1146, 39 L.Ed. 
2d 101. 
Compare 
Standing has been allowed to pursue 
§ 1983 claims based on injury to the 
members of an organization plain-
tiff without further discussion. See 
Church of Scientology v. Cazares, 
C.A.5th, 1981, 638 F.2d 1272, 1276-
1280, described in note 133 above. 
Organization standing also has been 
allowed without difficulty in actions 
under Title VII of the Civil Rights 
Act of 1964. See International 
Woodworkers of America v. Geor-
gia-Pacific Corp., C.A.8th, 1977, 568 
F.2d 64, 66-68, described in note 135 
above. 
Civil rights cases frequently involve 
circumstances that justify remedies 
in favor of nonparties without any 
formal need to attribute standing of 
members to an organization. As 
one example, in Doe v. Gallinot, 
C.A.9th, 1981, 657 F.2d 1017, 1024-
1025, the plaintiff clearly had stand-
ing to challenge procedures under 
which he had been involuntarily 
committed seven times without a 
hearing. It was found proper to im-
plement the declaratory judgment 
of invalidity by an injunction 
against applying the procedures to 
anyone. "The challenged provi-
sions were not unconstitutional as 
to Doe alone, but as to any to whom 
they might be applied." Cases of 
this sort frequently arise in deter-
mining the need for certifying a 
class action; certification may be 
denied on the ground that the scope 
of the relief does not depend on the 
character of the action. 
Collectively, these decisions suggest 
that there should not be a general 
rule denying organization standing 
in "civil rights" actions. Instead, it 
is better to ask whether individual 
participation is so important in a 
particular case as to defeat organi-
zation standing. 
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unique events affecting no more than a few people. Even if 
more people are affected, it may be better to force litigation into 
the formal representation procedures of a class action than to 
rely on the vague representation theory of organization stand-
ing. 
Once the three prongs of the Apple Commission test are sat-
isfied, a few barriers may remain. The most obvious is that it is 
not enough to show that an individual member would have 
standing; the other requirements of justiciability must be met 
as well. If the member's claim is not yet ripe or has become 
moot, the organization cannot maintain suit.147 Procedural and 
jurisdictional requirements also carry over from the member to 
the organization. If a suit by the injured member would be 
stayed in deference to a pending state proceeding, for example, 
the same course may be taken with a suit by the organization.148 
147. Ripeness and mootness 
Both the problems of ripeness and 
mootness are illustrated in Warth v. 
Seldin, 1975, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2214-
2215, 422 U.S. 490, 516-517, 45 
L.Ed.2d 343. One of the plaintiffs 
was an organization of building 
companies, claiming that restrictive 
zoning ordinances had impaired 
their business opportunities. The 
Court denied standing based on 
member injury upon concluding that 
none of the members had such con-
crete building plans as to demon-
strate a ripe claim. Another plain-
tiff was an organization of groups 
that were involved in developing 
low-cost housing. As to this plain-
tiff, one member had undertaken to 
develop low cost housing in 
Penfield, but had abandoned the 
plan. The Court suggested that 
had suit been brought at a time 
close to this abandoned plan, the 
member and the organization might 
have had standing. As to a com-
plaint filed three years later, howev-
er, it concluded that there was no 
sufficient basis to infer that "a live, 
concrete dispute" remained. 
When bank depositors did not have 
ripe claims to challenge bank rec-
ordkeeping requirements on the ba-
sis of possible Internal Revenue 
Service summonses, because no 
such summonses had yet issued, the 
bank could not assert their rights. 
California Bankers Assn. v. Shultz, 
1974, 94 S.Ct. 1494, 416 U.S. 21, 39 
L.Ed.2d 812. 
148. Abstention 
Chief Justice Burger has explored at 
length, in a separate opinion, the 
question whether a union, com-
plaining of unconstitutional interfer-
ence with the organizational rights 
of its members, should be able to in-
voke federal jurisdiction in circum-
stances in which federal courts 
would defer to pending state crimi-
nal prosecutions of the individual 
members. See Allee v. Medrano, 
1974, 94 S.Ct. 2191, 2208, 416 U.S. 
802, 830-831, 40 L.Ed.2d 566 (con-
curring and dissenting). He con-
cluded that the union "stands in the 
place of its prosecuted members 
even as it asserts its own constitu-
tional rights," since any other result 
would permit an unwarranted eva-
sion of federalistic deference. As 
to the union's claim of interference 
with its own constitutional rights to 
communicate with others, this con-
clusion seems warranted—at 
most—only if the union's rights can-
not exist independently of the rights 
of individual members. If there 
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